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In recent years, the Department of Defense (DoD) has responded 
to the growing awareness of mental health issues for military 
servicemembers during and after service. This Article focuses on 
veterans who have already been discharged from service, and 
specifically those who have been discharged under other-than-
honorable conditions for misconduct that is likely the result of a mental 
health condition, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
traumatic brain injury, sexual assault, or sexual harassment. 
Thousands of former servicemembers have been kicked out of the 
military for misconduct rather than treated for mental health 
conditions they experienced due to their military service. When these 
veterans later seek an upgrade from a discharge review board based 
on their mental health conditions, they are typically kicked again when 
the discharge review board denies relief.  
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In 2014, DoD created a new policy to give “liberal 
consideration” to veterans seeking to upgrade their other-than-
honorable discharges due to mental health conditions. The policy, 
known as the Hagel Memo, was later clarified and supplemented in 
August 2017 by the Kurta Memo. This Article analyzes how the Naval 
Discharge Review Board as a representative of the discharge review 
boards has implemented the guidance based on decisions released 
after the August 2017 Kurta Memo’s clarifying guidance.  
This Article contributes to the discussion on military and 
veterans’ mental health issues through the lens of how the discharge 
upgrade process fails to respond to the growing understanding and 
awareness of PTSD and other mental health conditions. This Article 
explains how the discharge review boards have failed to implement the 
liberal consideration policy guidance and offers a path forward, from 
a big picture redefinition of “Honorable” to specific revisions to Navy 
procedures that serve as examples for all the services to consider. The 
discharge review boards have the opportunity to acknowledge that the 
military abandoned these veterans at the discharge stage when they 
received an other-than-honorable discharge and—more importantly—
to provide relief by giving them a hand up rather than kicking them 
again. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Michelle Essex served in the U.S. Navy Reserve for fifteen years.1 She had 
an exemplary record of service as a Navy Reservist including multiple awards in 
recognition of that service.2 She was never disciplined for any misconduct.3 She 
deployed to Afghanistan from May 2011 to February 2012 in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.4 Her performance record from November 2012 to 
November 2013 could not have been more positive: “[Petty Officer Essex] is on 
fire and is the workhorse of this Det[achment]. She is the right person at the right 
time to further elevate the unit’s success.  Her LEADERSHIP and determination 
to drive others to perfection is unmatched and is a major asset to the entire 
command.”5  
After completing her reserve duty, Petty Officer Essex received an 
honorable discharge and then enlisted for active duty for six years.6 She served 
only four months and five days before the Navy discharged her on October 13, 
 
1. Michelle Essex is a fictitious name for the veteran in Naval Discharge Review Board (NDRB) 
decision ND17-01559. The decision is on file with the author. 
2. NDRB No. ND17-01559. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. (emphasis in original). 
6. Id. 
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2014, for using drugs.7 Given the Navy’s zero-tolerance policy for drug abuse, 
she underwent mandatory processing for administrative separation.8 Despite her 
strong record but for this one incident, her command discharged her—kicked her 
out—with an “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions” characterization and 
“Misconduct (Drug Abuse)” as the narrative reason.9 This discharge 
characterization tainted her previous years of exemplary service. 
Less than two years later, Michelle sought treatment for mental health 
concerns related to military sexual trauma (MST) she experienced while serving 
in the Navy.10 In February 2016, a civilian psychiatrist diagnosed Michelle with 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) due to the MST.11  
In September 2017, Michelle sought to upgrade her discharge to 
“Honorable” by filing the appropriate documents with the Naval Discharge 
Review Board (NDRB or “the Board”).12 Michelle explained in the application 
that the MST and PTSD she experienced led her to use drugs to cope with how 
she was feeling.13 She explained that she had an impeccable record of service but 
for this one incident, and that her mental health condition, rather than intentional 
misconduct, had caused the incident.14 She provided medical and service records 
as well as her own statement to support her upgrade request.15 
The Board recognized Michelle’s MST and PTSD diagnosis.16 It 
recognized her fifteen years of service with no other adverse action and 
determined that Michelle’s “diagnosed PTSD and MST was a mitigating factor 
associated with her in-service misconduct.”17 The Board described Michelle’s 
service as “honest and faithful” and considered her combat tour and her 
exemplary performance record.18 
The Board voted unanimously to change Michelle’s discharge status, but 
granted her only a partial upgrade.19 The Board explained that it “does not 
consider PTSD as a reason to completely absolve the Applicant of her 
misconduct” and that “significant negative aspects of the Applicant’s conduct 















20. Id. Throughout this Article, I refer to former servicemembers seeking discharge upgrades as 
“veterans” unless directly quoting from a decision with the term “Applicant” because the word “veteran” 
is more respectful of the servicemembers’ service than the generic term “Applicant.” The term “veteran” 
is defined by statute as “a person who served in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was 
discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable.” 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2018). 
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changed Michelle’s discharge from “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions” 
to “General (Under Honorable Conditions).”21 The Board did not change the 
narrative reason, however, and Michelle’s discharge paperwork continues to 
refer to her misconduct and undermine her record of exemplary service by 
referring to her reason for discharge as “Misconduct (Drug Abuse).”22 
Like Michelle, thousands of servicemembers have been discharged with 
other-than-honorable discharges due to misconduct that can be traced to a mental 
health condition. According to a 2015 report, more than 600,000 servicemembers 
received a less-than-fully-honorable discharge between 2000 and 2013.23 In May 
2017, the Government Accountability Office reported that 62 percent of the 
91,764 servicemembers discharged “for misconduct from fiscal years 2011 
through 2015 had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to separation with 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury (TBI), or certain 
other conditions that could be associated with misconduct.”24 In that five-year 
period, 57,141 servicemembers were kicked out of the military for what may 
have been behavior that resulted from a mental health condition.25 
After leaving the military with an other-than-honorable discharge, veterans 
are “generally ineligible to receive VA benefits, including education, housing, 
employment, disability compensation, burial benefits, and, in many cases, even 
healthcare.”26 They may also be banned from joining veterans’ service 
 
I use the term “veteran” more broadly than the statutory definition to refer to any person who served in 
the armed forces. See Bradford Adams & Dana Montalto, With Malice Toward None: Revisiting the 
Historical and Legal Basis for Excluding Veterans from “Veteran” Services, 122 PENN. ST. L. REV. 69, 
94 (2017) (explaining how statutory reorganization of veterans benefits law “has come to mean that a 
former servicemember deemed ineligible by the VA is essentially told that he or she is not a ‘veteran’ 
in the eyes of the federal government—despite the fact of his or her service in the armed forces”). 
21. NDRB No. ND17-01559. 
22. Id. 
23. INST. FOR VETERAN POLICY, SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, VETERANS AND BAD PAPER 
(2015), https://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/Bad-Paper-Fact-Sheet-June-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y2CT-4KE5]. “Bad paper” means “other-than-honorable, bad conduct, or 
dishonorable discharge, and may include a general discharge as well.” Michael J. Wishnie, “A Boy Gets 
Into Trouble”: Service Members, Civil Rights, and Veterans’ Law Exceptionalism, 97 B.U. L. REV. 
1709, 1724 (2017). 
24. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-260, DOD HEALTH: ACTIONS NEEDED TO 
ENSURE POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY ARE CONSIDERED IN 
MISCONDUCT SEPARATIONS, highlights (2017). 
25. Id. 
26. SUNDIATA SIDIBE & FRANCISCO UNGER, VIETNAM VETERANS OF AM. & NAT’L 
VETERANS COUNCIL FOR LEGAL REDRESS, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: CORRECTING “BAD PAPER” FOR 
VETERANS WITH PTSD 3 (2016), https://www.vetsprobono.org/library/attachment.312768 
[https://perma.cc/KF3R-7PHG]; see also Marcy L. Karin, “Other Than Honorable” Discrimination, 67 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 137–39 (2016) (discussing how the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Act (USERRA) has not protected veterans with other-than-honorable discharge and 
explaining that these discharges “have disproportionately impacted people with service-connected 
injuries like post-traumatic stress disorder and traumatic brain injury, servicemembers who have 
experienced military sexual trauma, and people with caregiving responsibilities”); Stacey-Rae Simcox, 
Thirty Years of Veterans Law: Welcome to the Wild West, 67 KAN. L. REV. 513, 564 (2019) (discussing 
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organizations, face challenges in employment, and experience homelessness.27 
These veterans are also “more likely to suffer mental health conditions . . . and 
to be involved with the criminal justice system, and they take their own lives 
twice as often as other veterans.”28 Veterans with other-than-honorable 
discharges are typically outside the care of the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA), and “[the] rate of death by suicide among Veterans who do not use VA 
care is increasing at a greater rate than Veterans who use VA care.”29 Beyond 
health care and economic resources, veterans with other-than-honorable 
discharges suffer a diminished status. They are “not permitted to wear their 
uniforms or receive a military burial.”30 In sum, their service is not honored, and 
an other-than-honorable discharge “impos[es] a lifetime stigma that marks the 
former service member as having failed family, friends, and country.”31 In the 
truest sense of the words, these servicemembers are kicked out and left behind.  
Once the military labels veterans with an other-than-honorable discharge, 
they have little recourse.32 Even though there are administrative remedies 
 
the potentially “severe” consequences of other-than-honorable discharges, including loss of rights to 
“educational grants, home loans, healthcare, and disability benefits”). 
27. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 3. 
28. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 1724; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BOOTED: LACK OF 
RECOURSE FOR WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED US MILITARY RAPE SURVIVORS 4–5 (2016), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/us0516_militaryweb_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QJP-
V255] (discussing the correlation of “bad paper” with “high suicide rates, homelessness, and 
imprisonment”). I’m not arguing that discharge status caused these effects, but that there is a correlation 
between discharge characterization and access to benefits, and the lack of benefits such as health care 
may lead to untreated mental health symptoms. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra, at 77; Tiffany 
M. Chapman, Leave No Soldier Behind: Ensuring Access to Health Care for PTSD-Afflicted Veterans, 
204 MIL. L. REV. 1, 16 (2010) (noting “the strong correlation between PTSD and substance abuse, 
mental health problems, and persistent misconduct”). 
29. See Hans Petersen, Other-than-Honorable Discharge? You’re Still Eligible for VA Mental 
Health Care, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF.: VANTAGE POINT (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/60349/other-than-honorable-discharge/ [perma.cc/M3HV-QGQP]; 
see also John W. Brooker et al., Beyond “T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former 
Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the Armed 
Forces, 214 MIL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2012) (“The military, through its discharge process, is creating huge 
handicaps to readjustment and reintegration into society by limiting the possibility of care and failing to 
at the least stabilize these warriors before their rough ejection.”); Rebecca A. Clay, Access to Care for 
All Veterans, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., June 2017, at 20 (describing 2017 suicide-prevention initiatives). 
30. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5; see also 38 U.S.C. § 2302 (2018) (limiting 
benefits to “veteran,” as defined in § 101(2) as a “person who served in the active military, naval, or air 
service, and who was discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than dishonorable”); U.S. 
DEP’T OF DEF., DOD INSTRUCTION 1300.15, MILITARY FUNERAL SUPPORT 3–4 (2017), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/130015p.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Y7HW-2L37] (stating that recipients of other-than-honorable discharges are ineligible 
for military funeral honors); Eligibility for Burial in a VA National Cemetery, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS 
AFFAIRS, https://www.va.gov/burials-memorials/eligibility/ [https://perma.cc/6K9Z-WTTT] (stating 
that recipients of other-than-honorable discharges are ineligible for burial in a VA national cemetery). 
31. Wishnie, supra note 23, at 1724. 
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5 (“Despite the high stakes for veterans, there is 
little meaningful opportunity to appeal a bad discharge (also called applying for an ‘upgrade’).”). 
The lack of “meaningful opportunity” to get the government to right a wrong is consistent with the ban 
on suits against the military for service-related injuries or harm. Id. (“[S]ervice members are prohibited 
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available for veterans to request a change to their discharge—called a “discharge 
upgrade”—very few discharge upgrade requests are granted.33 “[T]he vast 
majority of applicants seeking to alter their discharge status (well over 90 percent 
and in some years as high as 99 percent) are rejected.”34 The low grant rate 
reflects the “‘historic hostility’ in the military toward veterans with other-than-
honorable discharges.”35 These rejections are often based on the written 
application alone without the benefit of a hearing.36 Furthermore, the application 
form itself is inherently limited by its two-page list of questions with check-
boxes and small-text boxes, which do not lend themselves to conveying 
 
by longstanding Supreme Court precedent from suing the military for injuries or harm that ‘arise out of 
or are in the course of activity incident to service.’” (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 
(1950)). The U.S. Supreme Court reinforced Feres in 2019 when it denied certiorari in a case asking the 
Court to reconsider Feres in a medical malpractice suit where petitioner’s wife, “Navy Lieutenant 
Rebekah Daniel, died at a naval hospital due to a complication following childbirth.” Daniel v. United 
States, 587 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 1713 (2019) (mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas dissented 
from the denial and warned that “[s]uch unfortunate repercussions—denial of relief to military personnel 
and distortions of other areas of law to compensate—will continue to ripple through our jurisprudence 
as long as the Court refuses to reconsider Feres.” Id. at 1714. 
Though Feres still prohibits judicial claims, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2020 included a provision to allow administrative claims “against the United States for personal injury 
or death incident to the service of a member of the uniformed services that was caused by the medical 
malpractice of a Department of Defense health care provider.” 10 U.S.C. § 2733a(a) (2020). This 
administrative remedy falls short of calls to allow servicemembers to sue the Department of Defense. 
See Rose Carmen Goldberg, Commentary, Let’s Make 2020 the Year Injured Service Members Finally 
Get the Right to Sue DoD, MIL. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2019), 
https://www.militarytimes.com/opinion/commentary/2019/12/30/lets-make-2020-the-year-injured-
service-members-finally-get-the-right-to-sue-dod/ [https://perma.cc/53VX-259A]; David P. Sheldon & 





33. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5. It is also the case that very few veterans apply 
for an upgrade. Id. at 94 (“Though thousands of service members may have been wrongfully discharged, 
very few apply for a discharge upgrade or a change in narrative reason for separation.”); SIDIBE & 
UNGER, supra note 26, at 2 (“Tens of thousands of eligible veterans appear not to have submitted 
applications.”). 
34. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 5. 
35. Nikki Wentling, Pentagon Expands Policy to Upgrade Vets’ Bad Paper Discharges, STARS 
& STRIPES (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.stripes.com/news/pentagon-expands-policy-to-upgrade-vets-
bad-paper-discharges-1.485038 [https://perma.cc/TX6P-CXZ2] (quoting Professor Michael Wishnie). 
36. See, e.g., Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Boards, 
NDRB Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019, at 2–3 (June 7, 2019) (on file 
with author) (reporting 771 document review cases and 130 hearing cases in the first two quarters of 
FY19). 
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complicated information.37 Very few veterans have legal counsel or 
representation.38  
To some extent, then, Michelle’s story is a victory because any relief from 
the Board is relatively unusual. But Michelle received only partial relief. In 
giving her only partial relief, the Board ignored Michelle’s exemplary service 
and focused exclusively on the one flaw in her record. For thousands of veterans 
discharged with other-than-honorable characterizations due to behavior 
connected to a mental health condition, the odds of even partial relief are slim to 
none. Thus, they live in a world where the military kicked them out rather than 
cared for them, and when they later sought relief, the Board kicked them again. 
Rather than continue this pattern of punishing veterans for having mental 
health conditions—commander kicks them out and the discharge review board 
kicks them again—veterans deserve the opportunity for true relief in recognition 
of their service and the mental health condition they developed due to that 
service. Recent Department of Defense (DoD) policy guidance reflects this need 
for change. DoD requires discharge review boards to give “liberal consideration” 
to “veterans petitioning for discharge relief when the application for relief is 
based in whole or in part on matters relating to mental health conditions, 
including PTSD; TBI; sexual assault; or sexual harassment.”39 Liberal 
consideration recognizes the relationship between mental health conditions and 
behavior that looks like misconduct. The policy is aimed at correcting past 
injustices that resulted from commanders regularly discharging servicemembers 
under other-than-honorable conditions when their misconduct was related to a 
mental health condition.40 This Article contributes to the discussion on military 
and veterans’ mental health issues by assessing liberal consideration and its 
implementation.  
Part I begins with a brief background on discharge characterizations and a 
description of the discharge upgrade process. Part II briefly discusses PTSD and 
two military-unique stressors: combat and military sexual trauma. This Part also 
 
37. U.S. Dep’t of Def., DD Form 293, Application for the Review of Discharge from the Armed 
Forces of the United States (Dec. 2019), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/forms/dd/dd0293.pdf [https://perma.cc/2C89-
H2E7]. 
38. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND17-00909 (on file with author) (“Representation: NONE”). Of the 
477 NDRB decisions I reviewed for this project, three had a private representative, and eleven had 
civilian counsel. The rest had no counsel. See NDRB Decisions (Shared), GOOGLE SHEETS 
https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/19NYWu2HZkYvnmCw2h0zum8E_KBiciGrBl-
WYCLc_cl0/ [https://perma.cc/LZ9T-MJE7]. See infra notes 41, 200 and accompanying text. 
39. See Memorandum from Chuck Hagel, Sec’y of Def., to Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts 1 
(Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/mra/bcnr/Documents/HagelMemo.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P9A2-JXUZ] [hereinafter Hagel Memo]; A.M. Kurta, Acting Under Sec’y of Def. for 
Personnel and Readiness, to Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts, at Attach. ¶ 3 (Aug. 25, 2017), 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Clarifying-Guidance-to-Military-Discharge-
Review-Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/75X9-SFVF] [hereinafter Kurta Memo] (supplementing the 
Hagel Memo). 
40. See Kurta Memo, supra note 39. For an in-depth discussion of liberal consideration, see infra 
Part III.B. 
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describes the relationship between PTSD and misconduct. Part III takes a 
broader-scope look at mental health care in the military and then narrows to 
articulate recent policy guidance to liberally consider the relationship between 
mental health conditions and misconduct in the context of discharge upgrades. 
By using the Naval Discharge Review Board as a representative of all the 
discharge review boards, Part IV identifies four themes based on Board decisions 
to explain how the boards have failed to implement the liberal consideration 
policy guidance.41 Part V offers a path forward, from a big-picture redefinition 
of “Honorable” to specific revisions to Navy procedures that serve as examples 
for all the armed services to consider. These changes can provide hope to 
veterans who were kicked out of the military for mental health conditions they 
experienced due to their military service. The boards have the opportunity to 
acknowledge that the military abandoned these veterans at the discharge stage 
when they received an other-than-honorable discharge and, more importantly, to 
provide relief by giving them a hand up rather than kicking them again.   
I. 
DISCHARGE CHARACTERIZATIONS AND UPGRADES 
When a servicemember is discharged from military service, the quality of 
their service is memorialized on Department of Defense Form 214, Certificate 
 
41. This Article identifies problems that are not unique to the NDRB but are shared by the other 
services’ boards. This Article uses the NDRB decisions to generalize about all the boards’ decisions 
even though the NDRB’s rates of relief have been lower than those of the other services’ boards (though 
all boards’ rates of relief have been relatively low given the initial optimism of liberal consideration) 
and because the Navy and Marine Corps have high rates of other-than-honorable discharges. See, e.g., 
DoD Review Boards Select Claims Data Q3 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
https://boards.law.af.mil/stats_CY2017_Quarter%204%20%28Oct-Dec%202017%29.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C9MG-NL5X] (Quarter 3 for mental health claims adjudicated, Air Force Discharge 
Review Board (AFDRB): 27.7 percent; Army Discharge Review Board (ADRB): 40.9 percent; NDRB: 
25 percent); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DoD Review Boards Select Claims Data Q4 2017, 
https://boards.law.af.mil/stats_CY2017_Quarter%204%20%28Oct-Dec%202017%29.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C9MG-NL5X] (Quarter 4 for mental health claims adjudicated, AFDRB: 47 percent; 
ADRB: 63.6 percent; NDRB: 24 percent). Another reason this Article considers the NDRB decisions is 
that the “Navy’s screening policies [were] not consistent with DoD policy,” and the Navy’s training on 
TBI was also not compliant with DoD guidance, thus increasing the likelihood that discharge decisions 
were improper or inequitable. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 16. The Marine 
Corps apparently had compliant screening and training policies, but GAO found that implementation of 
these policies was possibly incomplete. Id. at 24–25. As a practical matter, the Article uses NDRB 
decisions because they are the decisions I had access to after the online reading room that provided 
access to all the boards’ decisions was shut down for an indeterminable amount of time in 2019. I started 
my research in January 2019 with the NDRB decisions and fortunately downloaded about 500 decisions 
before the reading room disappeared in April 2019. My research assistant, Heidi Weimer, created a 
database of the 477 decisions I had downloaded, and I used that set of decisions for my work on this 
article. NDRB Decisions (Shared), supra note 38. The Department of Defense has agreed to make these 
decisions available again. See Patricia Kime, Pentagon Agrees to Republish Discharge and Records 
Correction Decisions, MIL. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
military/2020/01/22/pentagon-agrees-to-republish-discharge-and-records-corrections-decisions/ 
[https://perma.cc/XM5E-LSKM]. 
1366 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  108:1357 
of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, known as a DD-214.42 The discharge 
characterization is a decision that a commanding officer typically makes as part 
of the process of separation from service, and an upgrade is something veterans 
can seek after they have left military service. This Section briefly summarizes 
the various discharge characterizations and the process for requesting a discharge 
upgrade to lay the foundation for the later discussion about the Board’s failure 
to implement policy guidance in reviewing discharge upgrade requests.  
A. Discharge Characterizations 
Discharges are categorized as either administrative or punitive. 
Administrative separations include Honorable, General (Under Honorable 
Conditions (UHC)), Under Other Than Honorable Conditions (UOTHC), and 
Uncharacterized.43 The ideal discharge is Honorable, and the majority of 
servicemembers are honorably discharged. For example, in Fiscal Year 2015, 
149,952 of the 189,411 discharges were Honorable.44 Punitive discharges 
include Bad Conduct and Dishonorable. In Fiscal Year 2015, there were 809 
punitive separations.45 This Article focuses on administrative discharges because 
the overwhelming majority of discharges are administrative and most discharge 
upgrade requests are from veterans with an administrative separation.46  
1. Honorable Discharge 
DoD loosely defines Honorable as “service [that] generally has met the 
standards of acceptable conduct and performance of duty for military personnel, 
or is otherwise so meritorious that any other characterization would be clearly 
inappropriate.”47 The Navy’s definition of Honorable is basically the same, but 
 
42. See DD Form 214, Discharge Papers and Separation Documents, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
https://www.archives.gov/personnel-records-center/dd-214 [https://perma.cc/BVV4-CK79]. 




[https://perma.cc/UWK4-TAHK]. Uncharacterized discharge includes situations when the service was 
too short to be otherwise qualified, such as entry-level separation, or for void enlistment. See DEP’T OF 
DEF., INSTR. 1332.14, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS (Jan. 27, 2014) (C4, Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/133214p.pdf?ver=2019-03-14-
132901-200 [https://perma.cc/HQT6-QWGE] [hereinafter DoDI 1332.14]. For a history of discharge 
characterizations, see Adams & Montalto, supra note 20, at 74–80. For a history of administrative 
discharge, see Bradley K. Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges: A Legal and Empirical 
Evaluation, 59 MIL. L. REV. 1, 2–10 (1973). 
44. DEF. MANPOWER DATA CTR., supra note 43. 
45. See id. 
46. Id. Of the 477 decisions in my decisions database, 453 involved veterans with administrative 
discharges and twenty-four involved veterans with punitive discharges. See NDRB Decisions (Shared), 
supra note 38. 
47. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a); see also U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, 
REG. 135-178, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE SEPARATIONS para. 2-9(a) (Nov. 7, 2017), 
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN3941_AR135-178_WEB_Final.pdf 
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with specific reference to the Navy: Honorable should be assigned when “the 
quality of the member’s service generally met the standard of acceptable conduct 
and performance for naval personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that any 
other characterization of service would be clearly inappropriate.”48 Beyond this 
general definition, whether a servicemember receives an Honorable discharge is 
at the discretion of the Separation Authority, consistent with secretarial 
characterization.49 The Separation Authority is typically the commander or 
commanding officer (the leader of a particular command), but may be a higher-
level official.50 
The Honorable characterization is deeply rooted in the military culture of 
maintaining good order and discipline. As the DoD instruction explains, “[t]he 
quality of service of an enlisted Service member on active duty or active duty for 
training is adversely affected by conduct that is of a nature to bring discredit on 
the Military Services or is prejudicial to good order and discipline.”51 Military 
leaders consistently rely on the need for “good order and discipline” to oppose 
changes in military justice reform.52 The concept of “good order and discipline” 
is not clearly defined, however, and is mostly a matter of a commander’s broad 
discretion within the overall idea “that discipline is a fundamental basis for 
military effectiveness.”53  
Typically, the military determines Honorable service by considering the 
complete record of service, and only a pattern of misconduct can justify an other-
 
[https://perma.cc/XC5J-4D5E] [hereinafter AR 135-178] (same definition, replacing “military” with 
“Army”). 
48. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILITARY PERSONNEL MANUAL (MILPERSMAN) 1910-304, 
DESCRIPTION OF CHARACTERIZATION OF SERVICE para. 1, at 1 (June 30, 2008), 
https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1910-304.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z8H7-
GJV2] [hereinafter MILPERSMAN 1910-304]. 
49. 10 U.S.C. § 1141 (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1900-010, LIST OF 
DEFINITIONS para 1(y) (Sept. 20, 2011), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1900-010.pdf [https://perma.cc/8R7P-
P3CN]. 
50. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1910-702, GENERAL GUIDANCE FOR 
SEPARATION AUTHORITIES (SA) para. 1 (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1910-702.pdf [https://perma.cc/4M5H-
9UM9] [hereinafter MILPERSMAN 1910-702]; U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1900-120, 
SEPARATION BY REASON OF CONVENIENCE OF THE GOVERNMENT – MEDICAL CONDITIONS NOT 
AMOUNTING TO A DISABILITY para. 2 (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-
npc/reference/milpersman/1000/1900Separation/Documents/1900-120.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZPX-
4EVL]. 
51. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(1)(b). 
52. Jeremy S. Weber, Whatever Happened to Military Good Order and Discipline?, 66 CLEV. 
ST. L. REV. 123, 125 (2017) (“Despite agreeing to some modifications, military leaders have opposed 
proposals to remove certain prosecution decisions from the commanders of the accused 
servicemembers.”). 
53. Id. at 127. Also, in reviewing commanders’ decisions, “individual judges or court members 
must decide for themselves whether specific acts prejudiced good order and discipline based on their 
individual, unstated, fact-specific criteria.” Id. at 145. 
1368 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  108:1357 
than-honorable discharge.54 But even this general requirement for a pattern of 
misconduct can be ignored if the commander determines that “a single incident 
provides the basis for [an other-than-honorable] characterization.”55 The Navy’s 
guidance for types of discharge characterizations even more explicitly allows for 
one instance to justify an other-than-honorable discharge.56  
2. Other-than-Honorable Discharge 
DoD generally defines the various other-than-honorable administrative 
discharge characterizations, but the specific parameters vary by service.57 These 
characterizations are mostly based on a commander’s discretionary 
determination that a servicemember failed to maintain good order and discipline. 
This is demonstrated by a particular incident or pattern of incidents that 
“constitutes a significant departure from the conduct expected of enlisted Service 
members of the Military Services.”58 Even though DoD characterizes these 
other-than-honorable discharges as administrative and not punitive, they are 
often punitive in nature. An other-than-honorable discharge carries a stigma and 
bars access to many veterans’ benefits.59 The military specifically gives an other-
than-honorable discharge to recognize and announce to the world that the 
servicemember did not fulfil their service commitment because they failed to 
meet “required standards of performance or discipline.”60 Consistent with that 
failure, veterans with an other-than-honorable discharge are typically ineligible 
 
54. Though “pattern” is mentioned several times in DoD’s instructions for separation decisions, 
that term is not defined, leaving it to the commander’s discretion on a case-by-case basis. See DoDI 
1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 3, para. 10(a)(2); id. enclosure 2, para. 2(a) (“administrative process 
based on command discretion”). 
55. Id. enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(1)(c). 
56. MILPERSMAN 1910-304, supra note 48, para. 1, at 2 (“one or more acts [or] omissions”). 
57. Karin, supra note 26, at 159–60. 
58. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(c)(1)(a). 
59. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 6. An other-than-honorable discharge does not 
absolutely bar a veteran from all VA benefits, but it does create a presumptive ineligibility. See 
VETERANS BENEFITS ADMINISTRATION, Applying for Benefits and Your Character of Discharge, U.S. 
DEP’T VETERANS AFF., https://www.benefits.va.gov/benefits/character_of_discharge.asp 
[https://perma.cc/P2E5-87ZD] (“Generally, in order to receive VA benefits and services, the Veteran’s 
character of discharge or service must be under other than dishonorable conditions (e.g., honorable, 
under honorable conditions, general). However, individuals receiving undesirable, bad conduct, and 
other types of dishonorable discharges may qualify for VA benefits depending on a determination made 
by VA.”); U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., CLAIMS FOR VA BENEFITS AND CHARACTER OF DISCHARGE: 
GENERAL INFORMATION (2014), https://www.benefits.va.gov/BENEFITS/docs/COD_Factsheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZJC8-4569] (describing the relationship between VA benefits eligibility and character 
of discharge); see also ALI R. TAYYEB & JENNIFER GREENBURG, WATSON INST., “BAD PAPERS”: THE 
INVISIBLE AND INCREASING COSTS OF WAR FOR EXCLUDED VETERANS 4 (2017), 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2017/Tayyeb%20Greenburg_Bad%20Pap
ers%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAK8-AVQ3] (showing same). 
60. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY, MILPERSMAN 1910-010, ENLISTED ADMINISTRATIVE 
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for benefits and may face significant challenges in civilian life as mentioned in 
the Introduction. Even the General (UHC) discharge carries some stigma because 
it is by definition less than Honorable, though it does permit eligibility for some 
VA benefits.61 
B. Discharge Upgrade 
Veterans with other-than-honorable discharges can request a discharge 
upgrade through a military records correction board or discharge review board.62 
Each service has its own administrative boards as established by statute and 
regulation,63 and this Article focuses on the Naval Discharge Review Board, 
which reviews discharges for Sailors and Marines, as a representative example 
of all the boards. This Article focuses on the discharge review boards rather than 
the records correction boards because the discharge review boards are the first-
stage boards for those seeking relief within fifteen years of their discharge. 
Improving the quality of the decision-making at the discharge review boards 
could reduce the number of appeals to the correction boards.  
The process for requesting a discharge upgrade is standardized across the 
services. There are two forms: DD-293 and DD-149. The DD-293 is used for a 
request submitted to a discharge review board (DRB)64 and the DD-149 goes to 
a records correction board.65 Veterans may request a discharge upgrade through 
a DRB up to fifteen years after discharge,66 and they can appeal a denial to a 
records correction board.67 The records correction board is the only avenue 
available for veterans seeking an upgrade to a discharge of more than fifteen 
years old. The boards are expected to provide “uniformity among the Military 
Departments in the rights afforded applicants in discharge reviews,”68 though 
each branch has its own policies and procedures. A discharge review board may 
grant relief for impropriety or inequity. Regulations governing DRB standards 
identify the objective of discharge review as “to examine the propriety and equity 
 
61. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(b); Applying for Benefits and Your 
Character of Discharge, supra note 59 (listing the discharge requirements for various VA benefits). 
62. 10 U.S.C. § 1553 (2018). 
63. Id. 
64. Supra note 37. 
65. U.S. Dep’t of Def., DD Form 149, Application for Correction of Military Record Under the 




66. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a) (2018). 
67. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a)(1) (2018); see also Army Discharge Review Board, ARMY REVIEW 
BOARDS AGENCY, https://arba.army.pentagon.mil/adrb-faq.html [https://perma.cc/LV48-BZCA] 
(“[Y]ou may appeal the written discharge review decision by applying to the Army Board for Correction 
of Military Records (ABCMR).”). 
68. 32 C.F.R. § 70.4(b)(2) (2018); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 1332.28 para 4.1.2 (Apr. 4, 2004), 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/133228p.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X8HD-NN46]. 
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of the applicant’s discharge.”69 Impropriety is generally defined as “an error of 
fact, law, procedure, or discretion associated with the discharge at the time of 
issuance.”70 Equity is generally understood as a question of fairness on the facts, 
despite a proper procedure.71 Equity relies on changes in policies and procedures 
that enhance rights or create “[a] substantial doubt that the applicant would have 
received the same discharge if relevant current policies and procedures had been 
available” at the time of discharge.72 A discharge may be inequitable if a 
“discharge was inconsistent with the standards of discipline”73 at the time of 
discharge or if on the whole “it is determined that relief is warranted” based on 
quality of service and capability to serve “even though the discharge was 
determined . . . otherwise equitable and proper at the time of issuance.”74  
The discharge review process is “slow, complicated, and opaque.”75 There 
is little information available to help guide pro se applicants about what it takes 
to be successful, and decision times range from ten months to almost two years.76 
In 2018, an article in the Military Times reported that “the three service review 
boards have nearly 26,000 cases that have been pending for more than 10 
months, the department’s standard for a backlogged request. More than half of 
those are before the Army, whose backlog is just under 14,000 cases.”77  
The discharge review boards and corrections boards have been under closer 
scrutiny in the past few years as they increased their backlogs and lengthened 
their decision times. Additionally, the boards inconsistently implemented (if at 
all) the liberal consideration policy guidance intended to account for the 
 
69. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(a) (2018). The records correction boards review for error, injustice, or 
clemency. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1552(a)(1), (f)(2); 32 C.F.R § 581.3(e)(3)(iii) (2018); see also 
Memorandum from Robert L. Wilkie, Under Sec’y of Def., to Secretaries of the Military Dept’s (July 
25, 2018) (on file with author) (directing boards to use clemency “to ensure fundamental fairness” for 
“applications based on pardons for criminal convictions”). 
70. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(b) (2018); DEP’T OF THE NAVY, SEC’Y OF NAVY INSTR. (SECNAVINST) 
5420.174D, NAVAL DISCHARGE REVIEW BOARD (NDRB) PROCEDURES AND STANDARDS para. 502 




[https://perma.cc/8L5Q-49B7] [hereinafter SECNAVINST 5420.174D]. 
71. 32 C.F.R. § 70.9(c) (2018). 
72. Id. § 70.9(c)(1)(ii). 
73. Id. § 70.9(c)(2). 
74. Id. § 70.9(c)(3); SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70, at 503. 
75. VETERANS LEGAL CLINIC, LEGAL SERVS. CTR. OF HARV. LAW SCH., UNDERSERVED: HOW 
THE VA WRONGFULLY EXCLUDES VETERANS WITH BAD PAPER 19 (2016), https://www.swords-to-
plowshares.org/wp-content/uploads/Underserved.pdf [https://perma.cc/MEC4-7L7L]. 
76. See id.; Robert Powers, supra note 36, at 4 (showing an average length of ten months to 
decision for documentary review and twenty-two months to decision for personal appearance hearing); 
see also SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 1, 11; Alissa Figueroa, A Losing Battle, FUSION (2014), 
http://interactive.fusion.net/a-losing-battle/ [https://perma.cc/Q93T-J7DX]. 
77. Leo Shane III, Can DoD Fix the Painfully Long Wait for Reviews of Bad-Paper Discharges?, 
MIL. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-
congress/2018/09/28/lawmakers-eye-an-overhaul-of-military-review-boards-system/ 
[https://perma.cc/R4Y4-967P]. 
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relationship between mental health conditions and behavior defined as 
misconduct under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The liberal 
consideration policy guidance reflects a better understanding of the relationship 
between mental health and behavior, and at least questions—if not fully rejects—
the traditional response to kick out servicemembers for misconduct that is related 
to PTSD or other mental health conditions. The next Section explains the 
relationship between mental health and behavior in the military as well as 
identifies military-unique stressors.   
II. 
HOW TO GET KICKED OUT: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER AND 
MILITARY SERVICE 
Many servicemembers were (and continue to be) kicked out of the military 
with an other-than-honorable discharge characterization for misconduct when 
that misconduct is actually a result of PTSD, traumatic brain injury (TBI), 
military sexual assault, or other mental health conditions. PTSD “is a psychiatric 
disorder that can occur in people who have experienced or witnessed a traumatic 
event such as a natural disaster, a serious accident, a terrorist act, war/combat, 
rape or other violent personal assault.”78 Servicemember PTSD has historically 
been referred to as “shell shock” and “combat fatigue,” and although this mental 
health condition is not limited to military servicemembers, the particular nature 
of military service may increase the chances a person experiences a traumatic 
event, or stressor, that causes PTSD.79 In this Section, I briefly explain two 
uniquely military stressors for PTSD, combat and military sexual trauma, and 
then discuss how PTSD affects behavior.  
A. PTSD: Traditional Combat-Related and Military Sexual Trauma 
The modern understanding of PTSD grew from the experiences of those 
who served in the Vietnam War and the mental health struggles returning 
veterans experienced and continue to experience.80 In 1980, five years after the 
Vietnam War ended, the American Psychiatric Association recognized PTSD as 
 
78. What is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/ptsd/what-is-ptsd [https://perma.cc/TJ3M-JTAP]; see also 
NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, PTSD Basics, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS AFF., 
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/what/ptsd_basics.asp [https://perma.cc/4B36-XYXD] (“PTSD . . . 
is a mental health problem that some people develop after experiencing or witnessing a life-threatening 
event, like combat, a natural disaster, a car accident, or sexual assault.”). 
79. See What is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, supra note 78. 
80. PUBLIC HEALTH, PTSD and Vietnam Veterans: A Lasting Issue 40 Years Later, U.S. DEP’T 
VETERANS AFF., https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/publications/agent-orange/agent-orange-
summer-2015/nvvls.asp [https://perma.cc/7RXC-77EE] (“It was first officially recognized as a mental 
health condition in 1980, only five years after the end of the Vietnam War. For hundreds of years, these 
symptoms have been described under different names in soldiers from many wars. However, Vietnam 
Veterans with these symptoms were the first to have the term ‘PTSD’ applied to them. Despite the 
passage of 50 years since the war, for some Vietnam Veterans, PTSD remains a chronic reality of 
everyday life.”). For a brief history of PTSD, see Chapman, supra note 28, at 6–23. 
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a “disorder” by adding it to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, thus finally legitimizing the various combat and combat-related 
mental health experiences of many Vietnam veterans.81 A VA study in 1983 
concluded that “as many as 15 percent of Veterans had PTSD.”82 Estimates 
suggest that “[30 percent] of Vietnam Veterans have had PTSD in their 
lifetime.”83 Even though experts later validated PTSD as a legitimate mental 
health diagnosis, that recognition did not help the many veterans the military 
already discharged for misconduct symptomatic of PTSD. In 2014, a class action 
lawsuit brought attention to Vietnam veterans in this situation.84 The case was 
settled to achieve reforms, shining a light on the injustices that veterans with 
PTSD faced seeking a discharge upgrade, and directly led to new policy 
guidance, as discussed in Part III.B.85  
The military’s inadequate care for Vietnam veterans with PTSD is well 
documented,86 and the inadequacy continues with current-conflict veterans.87 As 
Professor Stacey-Rae Simcox explained, Vietnam veterans are affected by PTSD 
more than by other conditions, and “Iraq and Afghanistan veterans find 
themselves suffering from higher numbers of brain injury in addition to PTSD, 
a result of the life-saving technologies and body armor, which help to limit the 
impact of explosions that in previous conflicts would have caused death.”88 The 
poor treatment of Vietnam veterans is certainly not excusable, but there was a 
real lack of understanding and awareness of PTSD at that time.89  
 




82. PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 80. 
83. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD, How Common is PTSD in Veterans?, U.S. DEP’T VETERANS 
AFF., https://www.ptsd.va.gov/understand/common/common_veterans.asp [https://perma.cc/HZ5V-
Y7YN]. 
84. Complaint, Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260 (WWE) (D. Conn. 2014). 
85. Monk, 2014 WL 7794807 (Nov. 18, 2014); see also VETERANS LEGAL SERVS. CLINIC, 
Monk v. Mabus, YALE LAW SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-yale/clinical-and-experiential-
learning/our-clinics/veterans-legal-services-clinic/monk-v-mabus [https://perma.cc/9GFH-N97A] 
(providing overview of case). 
86. See, e.g., Evan R. Seamone, Dismantling America’s Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to 
Treat, Rather than Merely Punish, Active Duty Offenders with PTSD Prior to Discharge from the Armed 
Forces, 37 NOVA L. REV. 479, 518 (2013). 
87. Karin, supra note 26, at 162–69; Seamone, supra note 86, at 510 (“Although, for more than 
a generation, military lawyers, veterans’ advocates, legislators, VA psychiatry experts in PTSD, and 
senior mental health professionals within the military have consistently raised concerns over the Military 
Misconduct Catch-22, there has been no successful corrective action. In fact, the Marine Corps recently 
learned that 326 of the 1,019 Marines it had dismissed with less-than-honorable characterizations (in the 
first four years following the war in Iraq) had legitimate mental health care needs. Despite this 
knowledge, the Marine Corps made no effort to determine whether that population eventually obtained 
benefits.” (footnotes omitted)). 
88. Simcox, supra note 26, at 564. 
89. See Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L., Jan. 2010, 
at 59, 59 (“[I]t was not until 1980 that the American Psychiatric Association officially recognized 
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Today, however, there is no such lack of awareness, and there is a 
significantly improved if incomplete understanding of PTSD and how it affects 
servicemembers during and after service. Thus, “the failure of the military to 
recognize and treat servicemembers from our current conflicts is inexcusable.”90 
The National Center for PTSD noted that for veterans of current conflicts 
(Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)), 
“between 11-20% . . . who served in OIF or OEF have PTSD in a given year.”91 
12 percent of Gulf War (Desert Storm) veterans experience PTSD, and 15 
percent of Vietnam veterans have PTSD with a current diagnosis “at the time of 
the most recent study in the late 1980s,” and about 30 percent “of Vietnam 
Veterans have had PTSD in their lifetime.”92 Combat is the most commonly 
known stressor for PTSD, and it may be “the most notoriously treatment-
resistant.”93 
But combat is not the only military stressor for PTSD. MST is another 
major stressor, and sexual assault is a growing problem in the military (or a 
problem with growing recognition). In a recent report, DoD reported a 13 percent 
increase in sexual assault reports in the military from FY 2017 to FY 2018.94 
This most recent increase follows a 9 percent increase in sexual assault reports 
in the FY 2017 report, indicating an upward trend in reporting.95 DoD defines 
sexual assault as: 
Intentional sexual contact characterized by the use of force, threats, 
intimidation, or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot 
consent . . . . [T]he term includes a broad category of sexual offenses 
consisting of the following specific UCMJ offenses: rape, sexual 
assault, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, forcible 
sodomy (forced oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these offenses.96 
 
Vietnam Syndrome—or as it came to be known, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”)—as a 
psychological illness.”). 
90. Simcox, supra note 26, at 565. 
91. How Common is PTSD in Veterans?, supra note 83. 
92. Id. 
93. Deborah C. Beidel et al., Trauma Management Therapy with Virtual-Reality Augmented 
Exposure Therapy for Combat-Related PTSD: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 61 J. ANXIETY 
DISORDERS 64, 64 (2019) (citing Bradley V. Watts et al., Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of Treatments 
for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 74 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 541 (2013)). 
94. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., APP. B: STATISTICAL DATA ON SEXUAL ASSAULT (2019), 
https://www.sapr.mil/sites/default/files/Appendix_B_Statistical_Data_on_Sexual_Assault.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XRL2-NMAZ]. 
95. DoD treats the increase in reporting as a positive: “With sexual assault being a significantly 
underreported crime, a higher proportion of reporting is an indicator that victims continue to gain 
confidence in the sexual assault prevention and response and military justice systems, especially when 
increased reporting is paired with decreased sexual assault prevalence (occurrence).” SEXUAL ASSAULT 
PREVENTION & RESPONSE OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT ON 
SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 1 (2018) 
https://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/FY17_Annual/FY17_Annual_Report_Fact_Sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N7PD-9LRQ]. 
96. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., INSTR. 6495.02, SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 
(SAPR) PROGRAM PROCEDURES, glossary at 122 (Mar. 28, 2013) (C3, May 24, 2017), 
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Trauma from sexual assault and sexual harassment that a servicemember 
experienced is called military sexual trauma, as defined by the VA. This term is 
broader than DoD’s definition of sexual assault, and it recognizes the 
“psychological trauma” caused by “a physical assault of a sexual nature, battery 
of a sexual nature, or sexual harassment which occurred while the veteran was 
serving on active duty, active duty for training, or inactive duty training.”97  
Just as with combat or combat-related stressors that lead to PTSD, MST is 
also a recognized stressor for PTSD.98 In fact, “sexual assault has a larger impact 
on PTSD symptomatology than any other trauma, including combat exposure.”99 
And MST “may be more strongly associated with PTSD and other health 
consequences than is civilian sexual trauma.”100 Some studies support “an 
estimated one in three sexual assault survivors experience[s] PTSD, as opposed 
to a 10 to 18 percent prevalence rate of PTSD for combat veterans.”101 The 
particular nature of the military and its culture of discipline and obedience “may 
make survivors feel undutiful or disloyal when reporting [an] assault.”102 
Survivors often experience “intense shame, guilt, and disbelief” as they struggle 
to reconcile the assault with “respect for service and chain of command.”103 
Based on VA data, mental health diagnoses associated with MST include PTSD 
(55.9 percent of women and 53.3 percent of men), depressive disorders (49.2 
percent of women and 37.9 percent of men), and substance use disorders (7 
percent of women and 15.3 percent of men).104 Thus, combat’s traditional role 
 
https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/649502p.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5VX7-XBX7] [hereinafter DoDI 6495.02]. 
97. 38 U.S.C. § 1720D(a)(1) (2018); see also INST. FOR VETERAN POLICY, SWORDS TO 
PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA: UNDERSTANDING PREVALENCE, RESOURCES AND 
CONSIDERATIONS TO CARE 4 (2015), https://www.swords-to-plowshares.org/wp-
content/uploads/Military-Sexual-Trauma-Understanding-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV54-8YZ3] 
[hereinafter SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA] (citing § 1720D(a)(1)). 
98. Evan R. Seamone & David M. Traskey, Maximizing VA Benefits for Survivors of Military 
Sexual Trauma: A Practical Guide for Survivors and Their Advocates, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 
344 (2014). 
99. SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA, supra note 97, at 15. 
100. Id.; see also Irene Williams & Kunsook Bernstein, Military Sexual Trauma Among U.S. 
Female Veterans, 25 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING 138, 142 (2011) (“PTSD stemming from MST 
is perhaps one of the most pressing mental health concerns facing female service members and veterans 
today.”). 
101. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 7. 
102. SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA, supra note 97, at 6–7. 
103. Id. at 6. 
104. Id. at 15. With the growing awareness and understanding of mental health conditions facing 
servicemembers and veterans, the concept of “moral injury” has emerged to identify the military-unique 
experience of trauma, especially MST. See, e.g., id. at 6 (“[M]oral injury [is] the pain that results from 
damage to a veteran’s moral foundation. In contrast to [PTSD], which springs from fear, moral injury is 
a violation of what veterans consider right or wrong. Transgressions can arise from individual acts of 
commission or omission, the behavior of others, or by bearing witness to intense human suffering or the 
grotesque aftermath of battle.”); see also Erik D. Masick, Moral Injury and Preventive Law: A 
Framework for the Future, 224 MIL. L. REV. 223, 224–25 (2016). Moral beliefs and expectations may 
be “culture-based” or “organizational,” such as military culture and organization. Id. at 241. This Article 
does not explore the relationship between combat-related or MST stressors and moral injury, see id. at 
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as a stressor should be understood as only one of the military-unique stressors. 
This broadened understanding of PTSD stressors also helps frame the various 
behavioral implications, as discussed next.  
B. The Relationship Between PTSD and Misconduct 
In May 2017, the Government Accountability Office reported that “62 
percent, or 57,141 of the 91,764 servicemembers separated for misconduct from 
fiscal years 2011 through 2015 had been diagnosed within the 2 years prior to 
separation with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic brain injury 
(TBI), or certain other conditions that could be associated with misconduct.”105 
Even though “the military has officially recognized the connection between 
service-connected stress conditions and misconduct—both on the battlefield and 
in manifestations after troops have returned home—and has urged commanders 
to at least consider mental conditions before taking disciplinary action,” such as 
issuing other-than-honorable discharges, that recognition has not solved the 
problem.106  
There is a significant volume of research and scholarship on the connection 
between PTSD and behavior, including how PTSD symptoms can look like 
misconduct.107 This Article does not go in depth on that research but provides 
some context as an anchor to support the overall need for change. For example, 
in 2010, a group of scholars discussed “three typologies that closely correspond 
to criminal behavior in PTSD sufferers: dissociative reaction, sensation-seeking 
syndrome, and depression-suicidal syndrome.”108 These three typologies along 
with six other “paradigm reactions among Vietnam veterans with PTSD” were 
identified by John P. Wilson and Sheldon D. Zigelbaum.109  
Each of the typologies provides a meaningful way to understand the 
relationship between PTSD and behavior that may look like misconduct when it 
is actually coping behavior. Dissociative reaction is triggered by the environment 
in ways that remind the servicemember of the original stress.110 The 
servicemember then “enters into what some call ‘survivor mode’” with “typical 
physiological symptoms of PTSD such as hyperalertness, hypervigilance, and 
excessive nervous system arousal.”111 The person may “go[] on automatic” in 
 
254–61, but recognizes that moral injury may be at play in these contexts. For example, moral injury 
may result in behavior that is misinterpreted as misconduct. Coping with moral injury can also result in 
“‘maladaptive coping,’ which may manifest as a diminished capacity or willingness to adhere to laws 
or values, and ‘can result in behavior that is simultaneously symptomatic and criminal.’” Id. at 248–49 
(footnotes omitted). 
105. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, highlights. 
106. Seamone, supra note 86, at 490–92 (citations and emphasis omitted). 
107. See, e.g., What is Posttraumatic Stress Disorder?, supra note 78; NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, 
supra note 78. 
108. Burgess, supra note 89, at 65 (emphasis omitted). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 65–66 (citation omitted). 
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this state, and for a combat veteran, this could mean “a search-and-destroy 
mentality in which his or her automatic reaction is to find and kill any perceived 
source of danger.”112 Sensation-seeking syndrome occurs when veterans “seek 
out activities that offer a level of danger similar to their combat experiences in 
an effort to maintain control over their surroundings.”113 These activities could 
be anything from legal skydiving to illegal drug activity.114 Veterans 
experiencing sensation-seeking syndrome are “capable of substantial 
premeditation” in contrast to veterans experiencing more of a spontaneous 
reaction to the environment.115 Depression-suicide syndrome manifests through 
“survivor guilt, hopelessness, despondency, and a deep depression.”116 A veteran 
may feel guilty for surviving combat, and this syndrome can lead the veteran to 
“subconsciously act out his anger through criminal acts,” even going so far as to 
seek out “suicide by cop”—engaging in criminal behavior to antagonize law 
enforcement to shoot.117  
In many cases, “the behavior associated with PTSD and TBI is behavior 
that puts servicemembers directly at odds with their commanders and the larger 
military culture.”118 Some of the “symptoms associated with PTSD and TBI, 
such as poor impulse control, loss of temper, impaired thinking, and poor 
exercise of judgment, may appear indistinguishable from the behavior of a 
servicemember who has chosen to rebel against the good order and discipline so 
necessary to the military’s culture.”119 The National Center for PTSD noted that 
veterans may “cope with their PTSD by drinking heavily, using drugs, or 
smoking too much.”120 PTSD may be unpredictable, but “studies indicate that 
substance abuse is significantly related to PTSD because alcohol or drug use is 
a method of coping with intrusive thoughts, nightmares, insomnia, and hyper-
alertness.”121  
 
112. Id. at 66; see also Chapman, supra note 28, at 15 (“Another associated feature of PTSD is 
misconduct, usually in the form of violent acts; in these cases, afflicted [servicemembers] are unable to 
transition from ‘survivor mode,’ where aggressiveness and hypervigilance is a necessity, to the relative 
calm of garrison life.”). 
113. Burgess, supra note 89, at 66. 
114. Id. at 66–67. 
115. Id. at 67–68. 
116. Id. at 68. 
117. Id. The National Center for PTSD identifies four types of symptoms for PTSD: “reliving 
the event,” “avoiding things that remind you of the event,” “having more negative thoughts and feelings 
than before,” and “feeling on edge.” NAT’L CTR. FOR PTSD, UNDERSTANDING PTSD AND PTSD 
TREATMENT 5–6 (2019), https://www.ptsd.va.gov/publications/print/understandingptsd_booklet.pdf 
[perma.cc/X7HJ-LD4X]. 
118. Simcox, supra note 26, at 562. 
119. Id. 
120. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PTSD, UNDERSTANDING PTSD AND SUBSTANCE USE: FOR 
VETERANS, GENERAL PUBLIC, FAMILY AND FRIENDS, 
https://www.ptsd.va.gov/publications/print/sudptsdflyer.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK92-88JY] (“Almost 1 
out of every 3 Veterans seeking treatment for [Substance Use Disorder] also have PTSD. More than 1 
of every 4 Veterans with PTSD also have SUD.”). 
121. Chapman, supra note 28, at 13. 
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DoD also recognizes mental health effects related to sexual assault in the 
military. Similar to the behaviors associated to combat-related PTSD, MST 
survivors may exhibit coping mechanisms that are potentially acts of misconduct 
under the UCMJ. Such behaviors include “difficulties with hierarchical 
environments” and substance abuse.122 For many MST survivors, the coping 
mechanisms lead to “misconduct” under the UCMJ, and “[t]housands of victims 
have been pushed out of the service with less-than-honorable discharges, which 
can leave them with no or reduced benefits, poor job prospects and a lifetime of 
stigma.”123 As the military better understands these stressors and related mental 
health conditions, DoD has worked to implement responsive support 
mechanisms. 
III. 
DOD’S RESPONSE TO GROWING MENTAL HEALTH AWARENESS 
DoD’s response to mental health issues includes efforts targeted at active 
duty military and veterans. DoD developed policy to better care for 
servicemembers’ needs while they are on active duty and to carefully consider 
mental health conditions as part of the administrative separation process. DoD 
also established “liberal consideration” as a policy aimed at correcting past 
injustices resulting from commanders regularly discharging servicemembers 
under other-than-honorable conditions when their misconduct was related to a 
mental health condition. Before discussing liberal consideration in depth, this 
Section includes some background on DoD’s other efforts for a more complete 
understanding of liberal consideration’s underpinnings.  
A. Providing Mental Health Care to Active Duty Servicemembers and 
Veterans 
DoD has provided guidance and training to educate the military about 
mental health issues, support active duty servicemembers, and better equip 
leaders to handle mental health issues. For example, Congress required a medical 
examination before discharge for any servicemember who “has been deployed 
overseas in support of a contingency operation during the previous 24 months” 
and had a PTSD or TBI diagnosis or “reasonably allege[d] . . . the influence of 
such a condition.”124 The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2013 included multiple provisions supporting mental health care for active duty 
servicemembers and veterans.125 Consistent with these changes, the Navy 
 
122. SWORDS TO PLOWSHARES, MILITARY SEXUAL TRAUMA, supra note 97, at 2. 
123. Mark Thompson, Military Sexual Assault Victims Discharged After Filing Complaints, 
TIME (May 18, 2016), http://time.com/4340321/sexual-assault-military-discharge-women/ 
[https://perma.cc/7A8H-JNBU]. 
124. 10 U.S.C. § 1177(a) (2012); see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3. For a 
brief discussion of DoD’s screening efforts, see Chapman, supra note 28, at 18–21. 
125. Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 582, 126 Stat. 1632, 1766 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1071 note) 
(“Comprehensive Policy on Prevention of Suicide Among Members of the Armed Forces”). 
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updated its separation policies to require a pre-discharge determination of 
whether a diagnosed condition of PTSD or TBI “was a contributing factor” to 
misconduct giving rise to separation from service, whether administrative or in 
lieu of court martial.126 This decision must be made “by a mental health 
professional diagnosing the PTSD or TBI, or a higher-level mental health 
professional.”127 The new policy also required a higher-level separation 
authority, the Chief of Naval Personnel, to determine the appropriate 
discharge.128  
In recent years, “the US military has made a concerted effort to improve 
how it handles sexual assault cases,”129 including requiring medical 
examinations before discharge for servicemembers who were sexually assaulted, 
just as it already required for PTSD and TBI cases.130 These “reforms have 
provided important additional resources and protections for service members” 
who experienced military sexual assault.131 DoD continues to study sexual 
assault in the military with its most recent report released in May 2019 and to 
implement its Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) Program in 
accordance with DoD Instruction 6495.02.132 DoD is also committed to its 
Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Strategic Plan, 2017-2021, intended to 
improve “organizational culture of dignity and respect where every Service 
member is empowered to prevent sexual assault and support victims when crimes 
do occur.”133 
No matter the cause of the mental health condition, DoD has recognized 
that mental health stigma “serves as a key barrier to help-seeking among service 
members in need of mental health treatment.”134 In particular, research has 
 
126. MILPERSMAN 1910-702, supra note 50, para. 1(c). The Marine Corps also revised its 
separation policies in line with the statute. See U.S. MARINE CORPS, ORDER 1900.16 CH 2, SEPARATION 
AND RETIREMENT MANUAL enclosure 1, para. 6110 (Feb. 15, 2019), 
https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publications/MCO%201900.16%20CH%202.pdf?ver=2019-02-26-
080015-447 [https://perma.cc/L9UN-W7KP]. 
127. MILPERSMAN 1910-702, supra note 50, para. 1(c), at 1. 
128. Id. at 2. 
129. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3. 
130. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 524, 130 
Stat. 2000, 2116 (2016) (amending 10 U.S.C. § 1177(a) by inserting “, or sexually assaulted,” and “or 
based on such sexual assault”). 
131. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3. 
132. See DoDI 6495.02, supra note 96. 
133. Ash Carter, Sec’y of Def., Foreword to U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., SEXUAL ASSAULT AND 
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE STRATEGIC PLAN, 2017-2021 (2016), 
https://sapr.mil/public/docs/strategic-plan/DoD_SAPR_Strategic_Plan_2017-2021_Signed.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YA7A-7XPB]. 
134. JOIE D. ACOSTA ET AL., MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA IN THE MILITARY 12 (2014), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR426/RAND_RR426.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Z27Y-C5EZ]. General Robert B. Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps, wrote a 
letter addressing Marine suicide: 
[I]t is time we have honest and frank conversations about mental stress, trauma, suicide, and more 
importantly, mental wellness . . . . 
 .  . . . 
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demonstrated that “men perceive greater stigma associated with seeking help 
than women do,” and that men “seek[] care as a last resort because they are 
expected to be stoic, controlled, and self-sufficient.”135 In the military, these 
expectations are even more entrenched given the norms of military life and 
“values of unit culture (e.g., shared mission, leave no soldier behind).”136 The 
National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013 also recognized this 
stigma by requiring a suicide prevention policy that “[i]ncrease[s] awareness 
among members of the Armed Forces about mental health conditions and the 
stigma associated with mental health conditions and mental health care.”137 
More recently, former VA Secretary David Shulkin implemented an 
initiative to focus on mental health issues for veterans. Secretary Shulkin’s 
policy gave other-than-honorably discharged veterans the ability to “receive care 
for their mental health emergency for an initial period of up to 90 days.”138 That 
policy had some positive effects, at least according to reports that more than three 
thousand veterans accessed that mental health care.139 In early 2018, the Trump 
administration approved a “way for servicemembers to be enrolled automatically 
with the [VA] for mental health care when they leave the military.”140 This new 
policy responded to the increasing rate of suicide for veterans and, in particular, 
to “the highest risk for veteran suicide,” which occurs during the twelve months 
immediately following service.141 Congress also passed new legislation in March 
2018 requiring the VA to provide increased mental and behavioral health care to 
veterans with other-than-honorable discharges who served in certain operational 
capacities (e.g., combat) or who were victims of sexual assault.142 
Even so, for many veterans already discharged with an other-than-
honorable characterization, these responses have had little effect and have been 
 
. . . Most of us are very comfortable talking about our physical fitness and the mental hardening required 
to perform as our Nation’s sentinels. We are less comfortable discussing mental and spiritual wellness. 
We can no longer afford to set those conversations aside because we don’t think they are important 
enough or we are too embarrassed that it might be perceived as weakness. 
David H. Berger (@CMC_MarineCorps), TWITTER (May 21, 2019, 11:01 AM), 
https://twitter.com/CMC_MarineCorps/status/1130866252321370112 [https://perma.cc/37UH-
GNNH]. 
135. ACOSTA ET AL., supra note 134, at 12 (citation omitted). 
136. Id.; see also Chapman, supra note 28, at 23 (“In the minds of some Soldiers, mental health 
issues, such as PTSD, are shameful, weak conditions.”). 
137. Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 582(b)(1), 126 Stat. 1632, 1766 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1071 note). 
138. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, VA Secretary Formalizes Expansion of 
Emergency Mental Health Care to Former Service Members with Other-than-Honorable Discharges 
(June 27, 2017), https://www.va.gov/OPA/pressrel/includes/viewPDF.cfm?id=2923 
[https://perma.cc/M356-S4X4]. 
139. Nikki Wentling, Trump Signs Order to Improve Mental Health Care for New Vets, STARS 
& STRIPES (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.stripes.com/news/trump-signs-order-to-improve-mental-health-
care-for-new-vets-1.505865 [https://perma.cc/D3A3-42FR]. 
140. Id.; see also Exec. Order No. 13,822, 83 Fed. Reg. 1513 (Jan. 9, 2018). 
141. Wentling, supra note 139. 
142. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, § 1712I, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348, 826–
28 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 1720I). 
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poorly implemented.143 Furthermore, “virtually nothing has been done to address 
the ongoing harm done to thousands of veterans who reported sexual assault 
before reforms took place” and were discharged under various other-than-
honorable conditions.144 While DoD’s efforts may benefit current 
servicemembers and future veterans, they do little to help the thousands already 
discharged with an other-than-honorable discharge for behavior likely related to 
a mental health condition.  
B. Requiring Liberal Consideration Toward Upgrading Other-than-
Honorable Discharges for Veterans with Mental Health Conditions 
For the thousands of veterans already discharged under other-than-
honorable conditions due to a mental health condition, potential relief is 
available through seeking a discharge upgrade. In recognizing the connections 
between mental health and misconduct, DoD issued policy guidance to military 
records correction and discharge review boards to govern decisions involving 
mental health conditions.145 The policy guidance requires the boards to give 
“liberal consideration” to discharge upgrade requests involving mental health 
conditions including those related to PTSD, TBI, sexual assault, and sexual 
harassment.146   
Liberal consideration is a way to view a servicemember’s behavior as a 
response to PTSD, TBI, or other mental health conditions, rather than as a 
voluntary or intentional violation of the UCMJ.147 Liberal consideration 
explicitly recognizes that there are conditions and experiences that excuse, 
explain, or mitigate what seems to be bad behavior and that the military needs a 
new approach to get past the status quo of rejecting most upgrade requests.148 
This Article focuses on the current iteration of liberal consideration, but this 
Section first provides some background leading up to the current policy. 
1. Early Liberal Consideration: The Hagel Memo 
The liberal consideration policy was in part a response to a federal lawsuit 
seeking redress for Vietnam veterans with PTSD who were denied relief when 
 
143. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 24, at 16, 22 (noting that “two of 
the four military services’ policies are inconsistent with DOD policies related to screening 
servicemembers for PTSD and TBI prior to separation” and that “the Army and Marine Corps may not 
have adhered to their own screening, training, and counseling policies”). 
144. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 3. 
145. In direct response to the lawsuit involving Vietnam veterans with PTSD and discharges 
well outside the fifteen-year limit for discharge review boards to consider, the initial memo on liberal 
consideration was specifically directed to the military boards for correction of military/naval records, 
and it recognized solely PTSD. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39. Clarifying guidance later included the 
discharge review boards and expanded the type of claims to include mental health conditions related to 
PTSD, TBI, sexual assault, and sexual harassment. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. 1. 
146. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. 1. 
147. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39; Kurta Memo, supra note 39. 
148. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39; Kurta Memo, supra note 39. 
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they sought discharge upgrades.149 Secretary Chuck Hagel released the original 
liberal consideration memo (known as “the Hagel Memo” or “PTSD Upgrade 
Memo” in veterans’ advocates circles). Liberal consideration was intended to 
help Vietnam veterans get upgrades based on “previously unrecognized Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder” because PTSD “was not recognized as a diagnosis at 
the time of service and, in many cases, diagnoses were not made until decades 
after service was completed.”150 DoD later clarified that liberal consideration 
applies to all veterans (not just Vietnam veterans) and to both records correction 
and discharge review boards, despite the Hagel Memo’s specific reference to 
Vietnam veterans and sole address to the records correction boards.151 
The liberal consideration policy relaxes evidentiary standards for discharge 
upgrades and mandates a liberal view of evidence. PTSD or PTSD-related 
conditions “will be considered potential mitigating factors in the misconduct that 
caused the under other than honorable conditions characterization of service.”152 
The policy requires boards to balance any mitigation with serious misconduct 
and to “exercise caution.”153 Liberal consideration also eliminates PTSD as “a 
likely cause of premeditated misconduct” and requires caution in considering the 
causal relationship between PTSD and misconduct.154  
Liberal consideration was codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d) for the discharge 
review boards.155 By statute, liberal consideration that a mental health condition 
“potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in the discharge”156 is 
required for two categories of cases: 
1) cases involving deployment “in support of a contingency 
operation” where the servicemember, “at any time after such 
deployment, was diagnosed by a physician, clinical 
psychologist, or psychiatrist as experiencing post-traumatic 
stress disorder or traumatic brain injury as a consequence of 
 
149. See Andrew Tilghman, DoD Willing to Reconsider Discharges of Vietnam Vets with PTSD, 
MIL. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/09/03/dod-
willing-to-reconsider-discharges-of-vietnam-vets-with-ptsd [https://perma.cc/BS9H-ZNJ9] (“The 
Pentagon’s new rule comes in response to a federal lawsuit filed on behalf of several veterans . . . that 
claimed the Defense Department was wrongfully denying discharge upgrade applications from veterans 
with claims and evidence of PTSD.”); see also Complaint, Monk v. Mabus, No. 3:14-cv-00260 (WWE) 
(D. Conn. 2014). 
150. Hagel Memo, supra note 39, at 1. 
151. Memorandum from Brad Carson, Acting Principal Deputy Under Sec’y of Def., to 
Secretaries of the Military Dept’s (Feb. 24, 2016), https://ctveteranslegal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/10/carson.pdf [https://perma.cc/NBB3-AZDQ]. 
152. Hagel Memo, supra note 39, attach. at 1. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. attach. at 2. 
155. This legislative change satisfied one of the Unfinished Business report’s recommendations 
to codify “liberal standards of consideration for evidence of PTSD.” See SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 
26, at 9. Congress did not, however, go as far as to codify “a presumption of record correction for 
veterans with documented PTSD,” as the report urged. See id. 
156. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d)(3)(A)(ii) (2018). 
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that deployment”;157 and  
2) cases involving PTSD or TBI “related to combat or military 
sexual trauma.”158  
In these cases, the boards are required to “review the case with liberal 
consideration to the former member that post-traumatic stress disorder or 
traumatic brain injury potentially contributed to the circumstances resulting in 
the discharge” of a lesser characterization.159 This statute also established the 
requirement to expedite decisions in cases involving PTSD or TBI160 and to 
include on the review board in all cases from the two categories defined above 
“a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a physician with training on mental 
health issues connected with post traumatic stress disorder or traumatic brain 
injury (as applicable).”161  
The overall thrust of the liberal consideration policy is that the boards 
should grant more upgrades to veterans with mental health conditions because 
those conditions mitigate their misconduct.162 There was an initial increase in 
upgrades after the boards first implemented liberal consideration. A joint study 
of the Army Board for the Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) for the first 
year post-Hagel Memo determined that “[t]he overall grant rate for all veterans 
applying for PTSD-based discharge upgrades . . . [rose] more than twelve-fold 
from 3.7% in 2013 to 45%.”163 Vietnam veterans made up 67 percent of 
applicants and had a much higher grant rate than other veterans.164 The ABCMR 
granted seventy-four out of one hundred applications for veterans with a PTSD 
diagnosis and zero of fifty-four for veterans who did not submit evidence of any 
 
157. Id. § 1553(d)(1)(A). 
158. Id. § 1553(d)(3)(B). 
159. Id. § 1553(d)(3)(A)(ii). 
160. Id. § 1553(d)(2). 
161. Id. § 1553(d)(1)(A). 
162. See Lisa Ferdinando, DoD Clarifies Liberal Consideration for Veterans’ Discharge 
Upgrade Requests, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. (Aug. 28, 2017), 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/Article/1292904/dod-clarifies-liberal-consideration-
for-veterans-discharge-upgrade-requests [https://perma.cc/EQ6B-BVCW] (noting that liberal 
consideration is intended to “ease the burden on veterans”); see also Dep’t of Def., DoD Clarifies 
Discharge Upgrade Requests 00:14–00:35 (Aug. 24, 2017), YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syMRP0kmlLU (Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Yager, 
acting director of legal policy in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and 
Readiness, explaining that liberal consideration intends to give veterans “a reasonable opportunity and 
that the burdens are not unreasonable on the veteran to be able to establish when in fact [their] basis for 
discharge was precipitated by things outside the veteran’s control like mental health conditions or post-
traumatic stress. And so this clarifying guidance is intended to ease those burdens and make it easier for 
an applicant to establish that.”). 
163. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 2. The inadequate implementation was also documented 
and at issue in Amended Complaint, Kennedy v. Esper, No. 3:16-cv-02010-WWE (D. Conn. Apr. 17, 
2017). 
164. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 2. Of course, part of the high percentage for Vietnam 
veteran applicants here is that current-era veterans go to the discharge review board first, but Vietnam 
veterans can only seek redress through the records correction boards due to the fifteen-year statute of 
limitations at the discharge review boards. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(a). 
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diagnosis.165 This report focused on the ABCMR because of the Army’s 
“comprehensive response” to a FOIA request, a response that included “copies 
of 164 post-PTSD Upgrade Memo decisions on PTSD-based discharge upgrade 
applications.”166  
Despite some increase in grant rates, the boards did not fully implement 
liberal consideration. Yale Law School’s Legal Services Clinic filed two class 
action lawsuits documenting this lack of implementation, one against the 
Army167 and one against the Navy.168 In both cases, the named plaintiffs 
explained how their misconduct was the result of a diagnosed mental health 
condition and that they were entitled to an upgrade under the Hagel Memo’s 
liberal consideration policy because of their mental health condition and its 
nexus to their behavior.169 In a major win for veterans, the court certified a class 
in both cases.170 Both cases are docketed to move forward, but there are no 
decisions on the merits yet.171  
 
165. SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 2. 
166. Id. at 5. 
167. Amended Complaint, Kennedy, supra note 163. 
168. Complaint, Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2018). 
169. In Kennedy v. Esper, the case against the Army, the court certified a class of Army veterans 
of the Iraq and Afghanistan era who: 
a) were discharged with a less-than[-]Honorable service characterization (this 
includes General and Other than Honorable discharges from the Army, Army 
Reserve, and Army National Guard, but not Bad Conduct or Dishonorable 
discharges); 
b) have not received discharge upgrades to Honorable; and 
c) have diagnoses of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions or records documenting 
one or more symptoms of PTSD or PTSD-related conditions at the time of 
discharge attributable to their military service under the Hagel Memo 
standards of liberal and special consideration. 
No. 3:16-cv-02010-WWE, 2018 WL 6727353, at *1 (D. Conn. Dec. 21, 2018). And in Manker, the case 
against the Navy, the court certified a class of Navy and Marine Corps veterans of the Iraq and 
Afghanistan era who: 
(a) were discharged from the Navy, Navy Reserves, Marine Corps, or Marine Corps 
Reserve with less-than-Honorable statuses, including General and Other-than-
Honorable discharges but excluding Bad Conduct or Dishonorable discharges; 
(b) have not received upgrades of their discharge statuses to Honorable from the 
NDRB; and 
(c) have diagnoses of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health conditions, or records 
documenting one or more symptoms of PTSD, TBI, or other related mental health 
conditions at the time of discharge, attributable to their military service under the 
Hagel Memo standards of liberal or special consideration. 
329 F.R.D. at 123. 
170. See supra note 169. 
171. In the case against the Army, both named plaintiffs received upgrades to Honorable from 
the Army after the court remanded their cases to the Army Discharge Review Board. Kennedy, 2018 
WL 6727353, at *2. In rejecting the Army’s argument for mootness, the court explained in its decision 
certifying the class that even though the named plaintiffs received relief, the Army “has not demonstrated 
assurance that there exists no reasonable expectation that the ADRB will continue to disregard the Hagel 
Memo PTSD directive in its . . . review of discharge upgrade applications.” Id. at *4. The court also 
denied the Army’s motion to dismiss. 2019 WL 7290933, at *2 (Jan. 9, 2019). A judicial settlement 
conference was scheduled for January 2020. Posting of Michael Wishnie, michael.wishnie@yale.edu, 
to veteransclinics@lists.wm.edu (Nov. 30, 2019) (on file with author). In the case against the Navy, the 
court denied the Navy’s motion to dismiss and granted a partial remand. Manker v. Spencer, No. 3:18-
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2. Liberal Consideration Today: The Kurta Memo 
Approximately three years after the Hagel Memo and various reports of the 
boards’ inadequate and inconsistent implementation of liberal consideration, the 
Kurta Memo renewed and expanded liberal consideration for veterans with 
mental health conditions.172 Deputy Under Secretary Kurta called for “greater 
uniformity amongst the review boards” and for “veterans [to] be better informed 
about how to achieve relief in these types of cases.”173 Kurta went on to 
recognize that “there are frequently limited records for the boards to consider, 
often through no fault of the veteran,” rendering cases involving “[i]nvisible 
wounds” difficult.174 The Kurta Memo urges the boards to consider each unique 
case “and afford each veteran a reasonable opportunity for relief even if the 
sexual assault or sexual harassment was unreported, or the mental health 
condition was not diagnosed until years later.”175 The memo’s four-page 
attachment offers the most substantive guidance to date, with a series of 
questions for boards to consider.176 The attachment includes an eleven-item non-
exclusive list of how to liberally consider upgrade requests.177 For example, the 
guidance recognizes that “[m]ental health conditions, including PTSD; TBI; 
sexual assault; and sexual harassment impact veterans in many intimate ways, 
are often undiagnosed or diagnosed years afterwards, and are frequently 
unreported.”178  
The Kurta Memo reinforces the Hagel Memo with additional guidance 
based on DoD’s review of discharge upgrade policy and public comment.179 The 
Kurta Memo reflects DoD’s commitment to easing the burden on veterans and 
“ensur[ing] fair and consistent standards of review” for veterans seeking a 
discharge upgrade based on a mental health condition, sexual assault, or sexual 
harassment.180 The entire veteran-favorable policy is grounded in leniency; a 
Pentagon official described the clarifying guidance as follows: 
It’s in our interest to ensure those who have suffered injustice or believe 
 
cv-372 (CSH), 2019 WL 5846828, at *20–21 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2019). Though the court remanded the 
cases for the two named plaintiffs, Manker and Doe, the court noted “there is neither a basis for, nor 
justice in staying, the entire class action while that limited remand goes forward.” Id. at *19. For the 
partial remand, the court ordered the NDRB to “issue its decisions following the consideration on 
remand not later than March 7, 2020.” Id. at *20. The parties are directed to file the decisions with the 
court, and the court stayed the proceedings pending those decisions but only in regard to Manker and 
Doe. Id. A judicial settlement conference was scheduled for February 2020. Posting of Michael Wishnie, 
supra. 




176. See id. attach. 
177. Id. attach. ¶ 26. 
178. Id. attach. ¶ 26(e). 
179. Kurta Memo, supra note 39; see also Wentling, supra note 35 (“After Hagel issued his 
memo three years ago, observers said the guidance was applied differently based on military branch, 
and veterans’ applications for upgrades grew into a backlog of cases.”). 
180. Kurta Memo, supra note 39. 
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their discharge is unfair, that they have a reasonable opportunity . . . to 
establish the basis for their discharge was precipitated by things outside 
their control. This clarifying guidance is intended to ease those burdens 
and make it easier for an applicant to establish that.181 
To that end, the Kurta Memo provides the boards a four-question analytical 
framework to implement liberal consideration: 
a. Did the veteran have a condition or experience that may excuse 
or mitigate the discharge? 
b. Did that condition exist/experience occur during military 
service? 
c. Does that condition or experience actually excuse or mitigate 
the discharge? 
d. Does that condition or experience outweigh the discharge?182 
The Kurta Memo identifies categories of evidence, in addition to or in the 
absence of a medical diagnosis that the boards can use to establish the existence 
of a veteran’s mental health condition. The Kurta Memo also addresses the nexus 
issue by directing boards to give liberal consideration to “[c]onditions or 
experiences that may reasonably have existed at the time of discharge” and to 
consider those conditions or experiences as “excusing or mitigating the 
discharge.”183 It implicitly suggests that there should be many cases that merit 
relief based on liberal consideration, stating that “[i]n some cases, the severity of 
misconduct may outweigh any mitigation from mental health conditions.”184 
This language limits the number of cases; although not quantified, “some” does 
not suggest “most.” The guidance is permissive, indicating that even severe 
misconduct may be mitigated. The Kurta Memo further allows room for the 
boards to excuse premeditated conduct in line with the sensation-seeking and 
depression-suicide syndromes.185 The Kurta Memo also explains that mental 
health conditions “inherently affect one’s behaviors and choices causing 
veterans to think and behave differently than might otherwise be expected.”186 
Reflecting the understanding of how mental health conditions affect 
behavior, liberal consideration sets forth a lens through which the boards should 
view discharge upgrade requests in a way that is favorable to the veteran. For 
example, the Kurta Memo directly addresses what to do about an absence of 
 
181. Wentling, supra note 35 (quoting Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Reggie Yagel, Under 
Secretary Kurta’s point of contact in the Office of Legal Policy). 
182. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 2. 
183. Id. attach. ¶ 16. 
184. Id. attach. ¶ 18. 
185. The Memo does not mention these syndromes but implicitly relies on the idea that mental 
health conditions may mitigate even premeditated misconduct. The Kurta Memo specifically mentions 
“substance-seeking behavior” and “self-medicat[ion]” as potentially mitigating misconduct. The Kurta 
Memo advises boards to “exercise caution,” but does not give any guidance on how to exercise that 
caution or how to evaluate “the causal relationship between asserted conditions or experiences and 
premeditated misconduct.” Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 19. 
186. Id., attach. ¶ 26(e). 
1386 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  108:1357 
medical evidence. Instead of using the lack of evidence to deny relief, the boards 
must consider the “veteran’s testimony alone, oral or written.”187 That 
testimony—alone—can “establish the existence of a condition or experience, 
that the condition or experience existed during or was aggravated by military 
service, and that the condition or experience excuses or mitigates the 
discharge.”188 Under liberal consideration, the boards are required to assess the 
veteran’s testimony in applying the four-question framework.189 Of course, the 
boards should still make a credibility determination about a veteran’s testimony 
and evaluate that testimony in the context of any conflicting evidence in the 
record.190 The Kurta Memo does not establish a guaranteed path to upgrade, but 
intends to make the path easier for veterans.  
The Kurta Memo also acknowledges that “[m]ental health conditions, 
including PTSD; TBI; sexual assault; and sexual harassment . . . are often 
undiagnosed or diagnosed years afterwards, and are frequently unreported.”191 
Under liberal consideration, the boards are required to shift the interpretation of 
a lack of evidence and see it as potentially consistent with mental health 
conditions. The Kurta Memo also specifically connects misconduct and mental 
health conditions to broaden the way the boards have historically viewed 
misconduct. Misconduct itself may be evidence of a mental health condition, and 
“[a] veteran asserting a mental health condition without a corresponding 
diagnosis of such condition from a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist, will 
receive liberal consideration of evidence that may support the existence of such 
a condition.”192 Thus, the lack of a diagnosis should not stand as an automatic 
bar to upgrade. 
Of course, implementation of liberal consideration does not mean a 100 
percent grant rate.193 But despite the potential for sweeping change194 in how the 
boards view misconduct in relation to mental health conditions, liberal 
consideration has not yet had a transformative effect on the number of discharge 
upgrades or on the boards’ reasoning in their decisions. The next part discusses 
in detail how the NDRB, as a representative example of all of the discharge 
review boards, has failed to implement liberal consideration.   
 
187. Id. attach. ¶ 7. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. See 32 C.F.R. § 70.8(e)(6)(ii)(B)(2) (2018) (providing that boards shall evaluate testimony 
for being “sufficiently credible”). 
191. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(d). 
192. Id. attach. ¶ 11. 
193. Id. attach. ¶ 26(k) (“Liberal consideration does not mandate an upgrade.”). 
194. Wentling, supra note 35 (“The Defense Department on Monday issued a sweeping policy 
change to afford more leeway to veterans seeking upgrades to their other-than-honorable discharges.”). 
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IV. 
KICKED AGAIN: THE NDRB’S FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT LIBERAL 
CONSIDERATION 
Through liberal consideration, DoD sought to respond to the historic 
problems for servicemembers seeking discharge upgrade requests. DoD has 
attempted a significant shift in recognizing how mental health conditions 
mitigate what was categorized as misconduct in an effort to provide long overdue 
recognition and relief to veterans. Recent statistics from the NDRB suggest that 
the shift has not taken effect. As part of a recent conference on veterans’ legal 
issues, the President of the NDRB shared the following statistics for FY 2019: 
 
Upgrade requests involving 
PTSD: 64 Cases / 10 Upgrades (17 percent)
195 
Upgrade requests involving 
TBI: 6 Cases / 1 Upgrade (17 percent) 
Upgrade requests involving 
MST: 21 Cases / 2 Upgrades (10 percent) 
Upgrade requests involving 
Mental Health: 90 Cases / 14 Upgrades (16 percent)
196 
 
These rates are low, and they are consistent with the low rates of upgrade over 
the past few years under liberal consideration.197   
Of course, liberal consideration provides no guarantee and does not require 
that a veteran receive an upgrade. Yet, the whole basis for liberal consideration 
suggests that upgrades involving PTSD, TBI, MST, and other mental health 
conditions should be granted liberally toward the goal of providing “a reasonable 
 
195. Note the data do not specify whether the upgrades were full or partial, and it is unlikely that 
all of these upgrades provided full relief. 
196. Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Bds., NDRB 
Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019, at slide 3 (June 7, 2019) (slides on file 
with author). 
197. According to the President of the NDRB in a presentation given in 2018, the grant rate for 
Navy discharge upgrade requests to which liberal consideration applied has been low. In 2015, there 
were 116 “liberal consideration claims” and nineteen were granted (16 percent). Robert Powers, 
President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Bds., NDRB Presentation to National Law 
School Veterans Clinic Consortium for the 2018 NLSVCC Conference, at 12 (Feb. 28–Mar. 1, 2018) 
(on file with author). Taking a closer look at the month-by-month breakdown, the low rate of upgrades 
is stark. See id. In April 2015, only two of thirteen were granted; and in June, only five of thirty-four 
were granted. Id. In 2016 and 2017, the grant rate remained low: 16 percent in 2016 and a decline to 14 
percent in 2017. Id. The grant rate for Marine Corps discharge upgrade requests to which liberal 
consideration applied was also low, although there was a jump in 2017. See id. In 2015 and 2016, the 
upgrade rate was 15 percent and 14 percent. Id. In 2017, that jumped to 27 percent. Id. In the first two 
quarters of FY 2018, the grant rates remained low. See Powers, supra note 36, at 3. For Navy PTSD 
cases, only five out of twenty-eight received an upgrade (18 percent) and for Navy mental health cases, 
only nine out of fifty-one received an upgrade (18 percent). Id. For Marine Corps PTSD cases, twenty-
six of seventy-two received an upgrade (36 percent) and for Marine Corps mental health cases, nineteen 
of fifty received an upgrade (38 percent). Id. 
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opportunity for relief.”198 And to the extent liberal consideration was a response 
to past low grant rates due to inadequacies in recognizing mental health issues 
and understanding how mental health affects behavior, it is reasonable to expect 
to see higher rates of discharge upgrades.199  
Despite the liberal consideration policy that mandated changes in how the 
boards review cases involving invisible wounds, the NDRB seems to reach 
decisions not to upgrade in the same way it did before liberal consideration. The 
NDRB decisions even use the same language as pre-liberal consideration 
decisions, further suggesting the Board’s lack of engagement with the Kurta 
Memo’s substantive guidance about evaluating evidence liberally within the 
four-question framework. There are various thematic ways that liberal 
consideration has not been fully or consistently implemented based on a review 
of the Board’s decisions.200 These themes represent shortcomings in both the 
policy itself and in the Board’s implementation of liberal consideration. 
 
198. Kurta Memo, supra note 39. 
199. The liberal consideration policy did not change the standards for an upgrade; those 
standards remain equity and propriety. Instead, liberal consideration requires the boards to consider the 
facts liberally and with an understanding of how facts may establish a mental health condition and a 
nexus between a mental health condition and what may appear to be misconduct. Thus, the expectation 
for an increased grant rate is not based on a change in the legal standards for upgrade, but a change in 
how the boards consider the facts to meet those standards. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984) (discussing the potential to wrongly 
assume a “rate of plaintiff verdicts to be an accurate measure of the influence of a legal standard” in the 
absence of “litigated disputes [that are] representative of the entire class of underlying disputes”); supra 
note 169 and accompanying text (describing the two classes certified as veterans with mental health 
diagnoses who should have been upgraded to Honorable discharges—or who at least warranted liberal 
consideration). 
200. Prior to April 2019, NDRB decisions were available in an online public reading room. In 
April 2019, the reading room was removed, and there was no information provided regarding its return. 
While the reading room was down, the online Boards of Review Reading Rooms webpage included the 
following note near the top: 
The Army, Air Force, Navy/Marine Corps, and Coast Guard Review Boards decisional 
documents normally published in the Department of Defense Reading Room have 
temporarily been removed to conduct a quality assurance review. We will update this 
webpage when we have a better estimate[] of when the decisional documents will again 
be available. 
Boards of Review Reading Rooms, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., https://boards.law.af.mil/index.htm 
[perma.cc/DC7L-MJU8].   
Litigation in early 2020 spurred the Pentagon to “agree[] to promptly make all past decisions of the 
[boards] publicly available.” Press Release, Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs. Program, In Response to 
NVLSP Lawsuit, Pentagon Swiftly Agrees to Promptly Make All DRB and Correction Board Decisions 
Publicly Available (Jan. 17, 2020), https://www.nvlsp.org/news-and-events/press-releases/in-response-
to-nvlsp-lawsuit-pentagon-swiftly-agrees-to-promptly-make-all-d [https://perma.cc/SE3T-S5DE]. The 
Pentagon promised to post all old decisions (pre-April 2019) by February 14, 2020. Id. But that did not 
happen. For example, as of February 15, 2020, the NDRB had only one folder of decisions available. 
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., Naval Discharge Review Board (DRB), BOARDS OF REVIEW READING ROOMS, 
https://boards.law.af.mil/NAVY_DRB.htm. The current reading room announcement states that the 
decisions since October 1998 are included in the reading room, but that some “documents have been 
temporarily removed to conduct a quality assurance review.” Boards of Review Reading Rooms, supra. 
Early on in my research for this project, my research assistant, Heidi Weimer, created a database of 
decisions as an alternative to the closed reading room. This database is limited to the decisions I 
downloaded in early 2019 before the reading room disappeared, but a partial database was better than 
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A. (Over)Reliance on the Presumption of Government Regularity 
By regulation, the Board presumes “regularity in the conduct of 
governmental affairs,” stating  “this presumption can be applied in any review 
unless there is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.”201 The 
entire scheme of liberal consideration is founded on the realization that the 
military was “doing it wrong” when it comes to discharging servicemembers for 
misconduct when that misconduct was the result of a mental health condition.202 
Thus, to the extent the presumption is an often-used default basis to deny upgrade 
requests, it is inconsistent with the underlying basis for liberal consideration. The 
presumption of regularity assumes the original decisions were correct, lawful, 
and in good faith,203 but liberal consideration mandates review outside that lens 
to fully and fairly evaluate whether a mental health condition mitigated behavior 
previously identified as misconduct.204 Continuing to rely on the presumption of 
regularity is one way the Board maintains its traditional approach of merely 
rubber-stamping the command-level discharge decisions rather than fully 
engaging in liberal consideration.  
In many cases, the Board ignores the recognition of past failures that gave 
rise to liberal consideration and instead continues to use the government’s 
“presumption of regularity in the conduct of its affairs” to justify rejections of 
discharge upgrade requests without fully engaging in the principles of liberal 
consideration. The conflict between liberal consideration and the presumption of 
government regularity is not specifically addressed in the Kurta Memo. Without 
addressing the conflict, the NDRB continues to rely on the presumption as a 
default justification for denying upgrade requests. 
 
no database. The database is available at NDRB Decisions (Shared), supra note 38. The database is 
intended to make the decisions available and organized in a way that will provide helpful information 
to future applicants. Giving future applicants better guidance on how to be successful is part of the 
reporting requirement, but as of now, there is little an applicant can learn about how to be successful. 
Even now that the public reading room is again available, there is a limited search capability and no way 
to download a batch of decisions. 
201. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211 (2018). 
202. See Hagel Memo, supra note 39 (explaining the impetus of the policy as the lack of 
recognition of PTSD as a basis for discharge upgrade). 
203. See Edward C. Segura, President, AFDRB, and Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Inside 
the Discharge Review Boards, at 4 (Mar. 20-21, 2019), http://www.umt.edu/law/files/events/10_Inside-
the-Discharge-Review-Boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/MVP4-QDDF] (emphasizing Air Force Discharge 
Review Board’s presumption that the “military discharged its duties correctly/lawfully/in good faith”); 
see also infra Part V (discussing how the Board views Honorable within a limited construct of how 
commanders assessed it at the time of discharge). 
204. On June 7, 2019, as part of a panel presentation, NDRB President Powers said that liberal 
consideration and presumption of government regularity are not mutually exclusive, but rather are just 
two different standards. But they are at least partially mutually exclusive, as liberal consideration was 
promulgated in part due to problematic government decision-making in discharge decisions. Notes from 
Presentation by Robert Powers, President, NDRB, Sec’y of the Navy, Council of Review Bds., NDRB 
Presentation to Veterans Legal Assistance Conference of 2019 (June 7, 2019) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Notes from Powers Presentation] (“[P]resumption of regularity and liberal consideration do 
not equal mutually exclusive.”). 
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For example, in the case of a former Marine who requested relief due to 
PTSD and TBI as mitigating factors for his behavior involving drugs, the Board 
relied on the presumption of government regularity to justify denying relief.205 
The veteran’s service record documented three deployments, one in 2005 in 
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and two in 2012 and 2013 in support of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.206 In this particular case, the veteran was charged 
with a felony later reduced to a misdemeanor related to marijuana possession and 
intent to manufacture.207 This felony charge led to the veteran’s discharge.208 In 
his upgrade request, he asked the Board to consider the underlying mental health 
reasons for his behavior, consistent with liberal consideration.209  
However, with only a cursory mention of the veteran’s assertion that his 
PTSD and TBI mitigated his misconduct, the Board noted the presumption of 
regularity and the veteran’s burden to overcome the presumption with 
“substantial and credible evidence.”210 The Board acknowledged the veteran’s 
statement that his mental health condition was the cause of his misconduct, but 
then rejected that connection as insufficient to overcome the presumption on the 
basis of the lack of evidence. The Board described the veteran’s actions as 
“conscious decisions to violate the tenants [sic] of honorable and faithful 
service,” and denied relief.211  
Even if the Board’s decision was a reasonable result based on the extent of 
the veteran’s involvement with drugs, the Kurta Memo demands liberal 
consideration before reaching that decision. For example, the Kurta Memo 
specifically recognizes “inability of the individual to conform . . . behavior to the 
expectations of the military,” and “substance abuse” as evidence of a mental 
health condition and the type of behavior that can be mitigated by mental health 
conditions.212 Liberal consideration recognizes even misconduct itself as 
evidence of PTSD or TBI, yet in this case, the Board does not appear to consider 
how PTSD and TBI may have explained the veteran’s behavior.  
Viewing the veteran’s request with the heavily government-favored 
presumption of regularity means that the Board is not taking account of all the 
research that shows that PTSD and TBI “may result in a series of cognitive, 
behavioral, and mood changes impacting an individual’s ability to function in 
 






211. Id. For other examples of cases where the Board relied on the presumption to deny relief, 
see NDRB No. ND18-00471 (denying relief when the government’s presumption was not overcome by 
“substantial and credible evidence” even though evidence included post-service documentation of PTSD 
and the veteran’s own statement that he suffered PTSD); NDRB No. ND18-00171 (ignoring the blatant 
relationship between the veteran’s reported and documented MST and the DUI that occurred on the 
same day in context of the presumption of government regularity to deny relief). 
212. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 5. 
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society,” with “some of those changes includ[ing] poor attention, memory 
difficulties, depressed mood and rapid fluctuations in mood, poor impulse 
control, and disregard for social norms.”213 Research like this is what led to 
policy guidance for the boards to “fully and carefully consider every petition 
based on PTSD brought by each veteran.”214 Yet the President of the NDRB 
freely and earnestly admits that NDRB members are biased in favor of 
commanders’ original decisions and typically think that the veteran probably 
“got what they deserved.”215 This position is consistent with the Council of 
Review Board’s statement that “the Department of the Navy, in issuing a 
discharge will always presume it was correct in that action.”216 The Board 
members are typically Navy and Marine Corps officers—often former 
commanders—who see the same “misbehaviors” they review as board 
members.217 Commanders play a “central disciplinarian role”218 in maintaining 
good order and discipline, and board members may be continuing that role in 
denying relief or merely deferring to their peers in that role. 
Liberal consideration—though the policy guidance does not explicitly say 
so—required the Board to be open-minded in reviewing this veteran’s case, 
rather than blinded by the presumption of government regularity. That 
presumption effectively blocked the Board from fairly evaluating whether the 
veteran’s mental health condition mitigated his involvement in drugs. Given his 
fourteen years of service—including a previous period of honorable service—
and three deployments, it is reasonable in the sphere of liberal consideration to 
view his involvement with drugs as unusual and possibly connected to a mental 
health condition. Yet, by focusing on the presumption of government regularity 
instead of potential mitigation, the Board did not appear to consider that the 
 
213. Stacey-Rae Simcox et al., Understanding TBI in our Nation’s Military and Veterans: Its 
Occurrence, Identification and Treatment, and Legal Ramifications, 84 UMKC L. REV. 373, 380 
(2015). 
214. Hagel Memo, supra note 39, at 1. 
215. Notes from Powers Presentation, supra note 204. Colonel Edward C. Segura of the AFDRB 
said the same thing on the panel: “I have a bias as a former commander.” Notes from Presentation by 
Edward C. Segura, President, AFDRB, Best Practices Before Military Review Boards, Veterans Legal 
Assistance Conference of 2019 (June 7, 2019) (on file with author); see also Complaint ¶¶ 218–19, 
Manker, supra note 168 (“Finally, Defendant’s high rate of denying PTSD-related discharge upgrade 
applications—about 85 percent—indicates that the NDRB has a systemic institutional bias or secret 
policy that discriminates against applicants who suffer from PTSD. This secret policy is unfair and 
contrary to the Plaintiffs’ constitutional right to due process because it contradicts public guidance, such 
as the Hagel Memo, and because it underlies a sham decisionmaking process whereby denial is virtually 
preordained for applicants before the NDRB due to prejudice.”); Segura & Powers, supra note 203, at 
4, 18 (emphasizing Air Force Discharge Review Board’s presumption that “military discharged its 
duties correctly/lawfully/in good faith” and NDRB’s treatment of conflicting facts as “[d]iscovered 
dishonesty [that] creates doubt concerning an Applicant’s submitted evidence”). 
216. COUNCIL OF REVIEW BOARDS, Preparing for a Personal Appearance Hearing at 
Washington Navy Yard, DC, SEC’Y OF THE NAVY, 
https://www.secnav.navy.mil/mra/CORB/Pages/NDRB/hphd.aspx [https://perma.cc/3U3W-H9HC]. 
217. SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70, ¶ 403(a) (directing that board members be 
“career military officers”). 
218. Weber, supra note 52, at 129. 
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veteran’s criminal drug activity was exactly the type of behavior related to TBI, 
even though the veteran asserted that the TBI caused or at least heavily 
influenced his behavior.  
Of course, liberal consideration does allow that “the severity of 
misconduct” in some cases “may outweigh any mitigation from mental health 
conditions.”219 Here, though, instead of weighing the severity of misconduct and 
considering whether the mental health condition mitigated the behavior, the 
Board merely rejected the veteran’s request by saying the “record did not show 
that a Mental Health Diagnosis was a sufficient mitigating factor” without an 
explanation for why and how the “record did not show.”220 While not explicit, 
the why and how was likely the presumption of government regularity and the 
veteran’s failure to overcome the presumption.221   
Furthermore, in this assessment, the Board ignored the Kurta Memo’s 
guidance that Honorable discharges do not require “flawless military service.”222 
An Honorable discharge may be appropriate “despite some relatively minor or 
infrequent misconduct.”223 Here, the behavior was certainly infrequent; in the 
veteran’s fourteen years of service, this was an isolated event. And within the 
construct of liberal consideration, a mental health condition can mitigate a drug 
charge. If the Board determined that a felony charge later reduced to a 
misdemeanor was not “relatively minor,” it should have stated so and then 
considered whether the infrequency of the conduct—a single isolated event in a 
fourteen-year period of service—justified an upgrade. That the Board rejected 
this possibility in favor of the government further shows how the Board defers 
to the deeply rooted presumption in favor of the commanders who made the 
original decisions. The Board’s rejection also reflects the deeply rooted ideals of 
good order and discipline, consistent with the Board’s unwillingness to accept 
that less-than-flawless service is Honorable.  
B. Refusal to Allow Mitigation of Willful Misconduct 
In the context of liberal consideration, “willful misconduct” is used to mask 
the Board’s lack of engagement with relaxed evidentiary standards and its 
rejection of a relationship between mental health conditions and specific 
instances of behavior. Liberal consideration responds to the connection between 
mental health conditions and misconduct, giving veterans with mental health 
 
219. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 18. 
220. NDRB No. ND17-01353, supra note 205. 
221. The paragraph that concluded with the determination that the mental health diagnosis was 
insufficient began with a statement of the presumption of regularity, suggesting the decision was related 
to the presumption. See id. In other decisions, the Board made the decision more explicit. See, e.g., 
NDRB No. ND17-01269 (on file with author) (“The Applicant attributes her drug abuse to MST brought 
about after the alleged sexual assault.  As mentioned above, the Board presumes regularity in the conduct 
of governmental affairs unless there is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption.  The 
Applicant failed to provide credible evidence to substantiate her claim.”). 
222. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(h). 
223. Id. 
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conditions reasonable opportunities for relief when past misconduct was due to 
a mental health condition. Liberal consideration recognizes that misconduct may 
be unrelated to a mental health condition, and the Kurta Memo cautions the 
boards to balance severity with mitigation.224 The Board, however, often replaces 
the required balancing with a blanket rejection of the need to balance by 
categorizing the misconduct as “willful misconduct,” thereby justifying denial 
of relief.225 As the Kurta Memo makes clear, the idea of willful misconduct is 
problematic in the sphere of mental health conditions because what appears to 
be willful misconduct can be a symptom of a mental health condition, for which 
a veteran should not be punished.226 Yet the idea of willful misconduct remains 
a default basis for rejecting a request for relief and affirming a commander’s 
decision.227 
For example, in a case where a veteran claimed that a mental health 
condition mitigated his drug use, the Board used the lack of in-service or post-
service mental health diagnosis to conclude that “the record reflects willful 
misconduct that demonstrated he was unfit for further service.”228 This decision 
completely ignored the Kurta Memo’s directives that a “veteran’s testimony 
alone . . . may establish the existence of a condition,”229 that evidence of a mental 
health condition includes “changes in behavior” and “substance abuse,”230 and 
that misconduct itself “may be evidence of a mental health condition.”231 This 
veteran had over four years of service and a Good Conduct Medal, among other 
awards.232 Given that the veteran had documented good service, liberal 
consideration suggests at least a possibility that his drug abuse was related to a 
mental health condition. However, the Board did not consider this, in disregard 
of the Kurta Memo’s directive to give liberal consideration to these factors when 
there is no documented diagnosis beyond the veteran’s statement.233 
Even when there is documentation of a mental health condition, the Board 
typically fails to implement liberal consideration by focusing on the misconduct 
rather than considering whether the mental health condition mitigated the 
misconduct. In a case involving documentation of a sexual assault report, mental 
health conditions, and a post-service PTSD diagnosis originating from an in-
service MST, the NDRB—egregiously and in flagrant disregard for the Kurta 
Memo’s guidance—denied the veteran’s request for an upgrade, citing to the 
 
224. Id. attach. ¶ 18. 
225. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221 (“Though the Applicant may feel that 
MST and other mental health conditions may have been an underlying cause to her misconduct, the 
record reflects willful misconduct that demonstrated she was unfit for further service.”). 
226. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 6. 
227. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221. 
228. NDRB No. ND18-00184 (on file with author). 
229. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 7. 
230. Id. attach. ¶ 5. 
231. Id. attach. ¶ 6. 
232. NDRB No. ND18-00184, supra note 228. 
233. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 7, 11. 
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absence of “credible evidence to substantiate her claim.”234 The veteran 
“attribute[d] her drug abuse to MST brought about after the alleged sexual 
assault.”235 Rather than engaging in an assessment of whether the MST and other 
mental health conditions excused or mitigated the discharge, the Board simply 
ignored the evidence that would favor an upgrade and focused on other evidence 
to reach a negative decision on the basis of willful misconduct.  
In that case, the Board may have focused on the fact that the veteran 
admitted to using drugs prior to enlistment—something she had not admitted to 
at the time of enlistment—in order to conclude that her asserted mental health 
conditions did not mitigate her misconduct.236 Although a former instance of 
self-medication for food poisoning had nothing to do with the drug use that led 
to her discharge, the Board used the veteran’s untimely drug use admission as a 
basis for determining “she was unfit for further service.”237 The Board, though, 
did not engage with an explanation for how or why that prior drug use 
outweighed the veteran’s documented sexual assault and mental health 
conditions. Instead, the Board just dismissed the evidence as the veteran’s 
feelings:  
The Applicant attributes her drug abuse to MST brought about after the 
alleged sexual assault. . . . Though the Applicant may feel that MST and 
other mental health conditions may have been an underlying cause to 
her misconduct, the record reflects willful misconduct that demonstrated 
she was unfit for further service.  There is not sufficient evidence to 
suggest that the Applicant’s claim of MST or other mental health 
conditions mitigated the Applicant’s misconduct.238  
The Board finally mentioned mitigation but did not engage in any sort of 
balancing to determine or explain why the mental health condition did not 
mitigate the drug use that occurred while she was on active duty.239  
The Board’s focus on the previous instances of the veteran’s premeditated 
drug use masked the actual question that liberal consideration required: whether 
her documented in-service MST, sexual assault, and PTSD mitigated the drug 
use that led to her discharge. By not considering the possibility that the veteran’s 
conditions “affect[ed] [her] behaviors and choices,” the Board failed to 
implement liberal consideration.240 Furthermore, the Board offered no reasoning 
to explain why and how the “MST or other mental health conditions did not 
mitigate the Applicant’s misconduct”; instead, the Board generically referred to 
insufficient evidence.241 To the extent the Board determined that the severity of 
the conduct outweighed any mitigation from mental health conditions, the Board 
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should have explained its conclusion to demonstrate its application of liberal 
consideration.242 Instead, the Board relied on “willful misconduct” to avoid 
implementing liberal consideration—or at least appearing to avoid it.243  
C. Rejection of Relaxed Evidentiary Standards 
Liberal consideration requires relaxed evidentiary standards in determining 
whether the veteran has (or had) a mental health condition that may have 
mitigated misconduct. Relaxed evidentiary standards are central to liberal 
consideration. The Kurta Memo specifically instructs that the veteran’s 
testimony—and that testimony alone—”may establish the existence of a 
condition or experience.”244 The veteran’s testimony can also serve as evidence 
that connects the condition or experience to the veteran’s military service and 
that the condition “excuses or mitigates the discharge.”245 The Board fails to 
apply these relaxed evidentiary standards to two bases upon which it denies 
relief: (1) absence of a formal mental health diagnosis, and (2) insufficient nexus 
between a mental health condition and behavior. 
1. Absence of a Formal Mental Health Diagnosis 
Despite the Kurta Memo’s guidance, the Board continues to reject 
discharge upgrade requests on the basis that there is no diagnosis, either during 
or post-service. The Kurta Memo explicitly instructs the boards what to do when 
there is a lack of medical diagnosis for the veteran’s claimed condition or 
experience: accept the veteran’s testimony as evidence of the condition or 
experience.246 But the Board continues to treat the absence of a formal diagnosis 
as a death knell for the upgrade request. In some of these cases, the Board not 
only rejects a diagnosis based on the veteran’s statement alone, but also finds 
that the veteran’s prior failure to reach out for support casts doubt on the 
veteran’s testimony. This approach, in conflict with liberal consideration, 
perpetuates the Board’s historic hostility to recognizing the role of mental health 
conditions in servicemembers’ behavior.247 By rejecting veterans’ statements in 
the absence of a diagnosis, the Board further entrenches the “Military 
Misconduct Catch-22”: the Board requires evidence a veteran does not have 
 
242. See, e.g., Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 18–19. 
243. NDRB No. ND17-01269, supra note 221. 
244. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 7. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. In granting class certification, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 
also noticed the NDRB’s failure to implement liberal consideration in the cases of the two named 
plaintiffs. Manker v. Spencer, 329 F.R.D. 110, 120–21 (D. Conn. 2018) (“It is arguably unclear from 
the NDRB’s explanation of their denials what standard is being used nor when PTSD would mitigate 
misconduct . . . . [T]he NDRB’s decision appears to use a stricter standard that seems to disbelieve that 
Manker could have suffered from PTSD without an official diagnosis and that his PTSD could have 
influenced his ‘willful’ actions.”). 
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access to, because the veteran’s discharge status makes the veteran ineligible for 
VA health care.248 
For example, in one case, a former marine explained that “his drug use was 
caused by an in-service medical health condition,” i.e., general anxiety and 
bipolar disorder.249 Under liberal consideration, the marine’s statement should 
have been enough to establish the possibility that he suffered from a mental 
health condition.250 Instead of liberally considering his testimony, the Board 
required “evidence to undoubtedly indicat[e] he was diagnosed with anxiety or 
bipolar disorder.”251 This requirement for undoubtable evidence goes beyond the 
Board’s regular credibility determination and thwarts liberal consideration.252  
The Kurta Memo also provides that the Board “should not condition relief 
on the existence of evidence that would be unreasonable or unlikely under the 
specific circumstances of the case.”253 In this case, liberal consideration would 
have required the Board to at least consider whether it was reasonable or likely 
that the marine’s record contained evidence of a mental health condition. Even 
if this were not reasonable or likely, liberal consideration would have given the 
marine the benefit of the doubt, especially because the Kurta Memo warns that 
“[m]ental health conditions . . . are frequently unreported.”254 Instead, in denying 
relief based on the lack of documentation, the Board’s decision shows no true 
engagement with liberal consideration. 
In part to remedy the past approach of stopping inquiry in the absence of a 
documented diagnosis, liberal consideration requires the Board to assess other 
evidence that could support the diagnosis. Here, the veteran’s misconduct was 
drug abuse, and liberal consideration recognizes “substance abuse” as evidence 
of a mental health condition.255 When faced with facts about substance abuse as 
a result of a mental health condition, and when nothing suggests that the 
requesting servicemember had a sustained drug use problem or that his drug use 
was not related to a mental health condition, liberal consideration would have 
instructed the Board to give favorable weight to evidence supporting the 
existence of a mental health condition. Instead of liberally viewing the evidence 
of substance abuse as evidence of a mental health condition, the Board cursorily 
 
248. Seamone, supra note 86, at 503 (“[T]he Military Misconduct Catch-22 concerns a very 
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rejected the veteran’s statement.256 The Board claimed to have done “a thorough 
review,” but did not discuss that review or indicate engagement with the Kurta 
Memo’s guidance.257  
The Board then went even further afield from liberal consideration by 
finding that the marine’s failure to reach out to anyone or take advantage of the 
various resources available to assist active duty servicemembers justified its 
rejection of his mental health condition. The Board noted that “the Applicant did 
not provide any evidence to indicate he attempted to use the numerous services 
available for servicemembers who undergo personal or mental health problems 
during their enlistment, such as the Navy Chaplain, Medical or Mental Health 
professionals, Navy Relief Society, Family Advocacy Programs, or even the Red 
Cross.”258 Under liberal consideration, the marine’s failure to seek assistance is 
consistent with how “[m]ental health conditions . . . inherently affect one’s 
behaviors and choices causing veterans to think and behave differently than 
might otherwise be expected.”259 Essentially, even if the Board believed that a 
servicemember suffering from a mental health condition should logically reach 
out to available resources, liberal consideration acknowledges that these 
conditions could cause different behaviors. At a minimum, liberal consideration 
required the Board to grapple with the possibility that the lack of reaching out 
was a legitimate behavior, rather than dismiss the discharge upgrade request 
based on a lack of evidence that the servicemember sought assistance. 
The Board has failed to implement liberal consideration in the absence of a 
formal diagnosis on several other occasions. For instance, the Board flat out 
ignored the Kurta Memo’s guidance when it concluded that “statements alone, 
without sufficient documentary evidence” cannot support a favorable 
decision.260 The Board noted the multiple sources where it did not find evidence 
of a diagnosis: military records, post-service VA records, and the veteran’s 
documentation submitted with the upgrade request.261 The Board also noted the 
lack of evidence that the servicemember had sought out any mental health 
assistance while in service.262 Instead of relying on the veteran’s statement as 
evidence of a mental health condition, the Board declared itself “unable to 
establish this contention as a basis for mitigation or consideration as an 
extenuating circumstance,” citing the absence of a mental health diagnosis.263 
But the veteran’s statement was evidence, and the Board should have at least 
considered that statement, even if it did not ultimately find the evidence credible.   
 
256. NDRB No. MD17-00856, supra note 249. 
257. See id. 
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2. Insufficient Nexus Between Mental Health Condition and Misconduct 
The Kurta Memo directs boards to ask whether there is a nexus between a 
mental health condition and misconduct.264 In evaluating the nexus, the boards 
must consider challenges the veteran may have in “presenting a thorough appeal 
for relief because of how the asserted condition or experience has impacted the 
veteran’s life.”265 Rather than extend liberal consideration in cases where the 
nexus is not clear, the Board has gone out of its way to deny relief based on 
insufficient nexus. 
For example, in case ND18-00046, the NDRB denied relief to a Navy 
veteran with almost five years of active duty service who claimed that PTSD due 
to an MST mitigated her periods of Unauthorized Absence (UA),266 because the 
Board found no nexus between the mental health condition and UA.267 This case 
is certainly the type of case in which, if properly applied, liberal consideration 
would support an upgrade: a servicemember experiences a military sexual 
trauma, had PTSD due to that trauma, and her PTSD symptoms included periods 
of her avoiding her military responsibilities through UA.  
The Board focused on nexus in this case and to some extent used the 
veteran’s evidence against her rather than viewing it through the lens of liberal 
consideration. In support of her request for an upgrade to Honorable, the veteran 
provided her statement of MST, resultant PTSD, and related periods of UA.268 
She also provided a record from the VA that showed she had a 70 percent 
disability “tie[d] . . . to” the PTSD that resulted from her assault.269 The veteran’s 
request for relief showed that the assault happened in 2004, relatively early in 
her enlistment, prior to her separation in 2008.270 She had one period of UA in 
2004 and two in 2008.271 The Board concluded that the veteran did not explain 
how the 2004 MST mitigated the 2008 misconduct.272 Here, the Board was 
wrong in focusing on an insufficient explanation in the veteran’s pro se 
application. The Board should have liberally considered the possibility that the 
veteran could still be dealing with PTSD four years after an MST and that it is 
not unreasonable or inconsistent for someone with PTSD to show symptoms at 
different times. The veteran may not have included a specific statement that tied 
the 2004 MST and the 2008 UA together, but she did assert in her upgrade 
request that “PTSD mitigate[d] her misconduct [because] her periods of UA were 
her protecting herself from additional military assaults.”273 Even so, the Board 
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denied relief, citing the lack of “additional explanation explaining how the 2004 
event can explain or mitigate the misconduct in 2008.”274  
Liberal consideration would recognize that PTSD “inherently affect[s] 
one’s behaviors and choices” in ways that cause a veteran “to think and behave 
differently than might otherwise be expected.”275 In relying on an insufficient 
nexus, the Board’s decision did not mention liberal consideration, nor did it 
explain how it liberally considered the veteran’s evidence.276 After a mere five-
sentence discussion of the issue, the Board focused on the gap in time as 
determinative rather than liberally considering how earlier events could have 
later behavioral effects: 
Without an additional explanation explaining how the 2004 event can 
explain or mitigate the misconduct in 2008, the NDRB found the 
characterization of the Applicant’s discharge was equitable and 
consistent with the characterization of discharge given others in similar 
circumstances.277   
The Board did not engage with the possibility that the gap in time may 
simply be different from what the Board expected, rather than a sign that there 
was no connection between the two events. Any number of triggers could have 
arisen in 2008 that related to the veteran’s 2004 MST experience. Perhaps the 
veteran was able to cope for several years after the trauma, but then broke down 
under the stress. Here, had the Board used liberal consideration, the relaxed 
evidentiary standards would have benefited the veteran by taking some of the 
burden off of her.278 Liberal consideration would also take into account the 
possibility that the veteran may have difficulty presenting a complete 
explanation of the nexus, given the severity of the PTSD and how it has affected 
the veteran.279 Rather than look to the unrepresented veteran to present a 
complete and cohesive explanation of how her PTSD mitigated her behavior, the 
Board should have eased the burden on the veteran by looking through the lens 
of liberal consideration to provide some relief and honor this MST survivor’s 
service.280  
In another example, the Board invoked “liberal consideration” but refused 
to accept a veteran’s explanation of the nexus between his PTSD and drug use. 
In this case, the veteran had over eleven years of active duty with numerous 
awards, including two Good Conduct Medals, three Meritorious Unit 
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Commendations, and overseas deployments.281 The military discharged the 
veteran for drug abuse, and he sought a discharge upgrade on the basis that his 
PTSD mitigated the drug abuse.282 He explained that he used drugs “to stay 
awake and protect his children” and “to self-medicate for the PTSD and anxiety 
caused by the previous trauma.”283 Self-medication for PTSD is a known coping 
mechanism, and finding a nexus between PTSD and drug use is reasonable, if 
not the exact scenario liberal consideration grew out of.284  
The Board mentioned liberal consideration, but cursorily applied it without 
explanation. With a dearth of reasoning, the Board stated that “even when 
viewing this case through the lens of liberal consideration, [it] did not find an 
adequate nexus and/or mitigation to warrant an upgrade.”285 The veteran had a 
solid and positive service record, serving “five out of the six years of the contract 
honorably.”286 He had a diagnosed mental health issue, and the Kurta Memo 
recognized drug abuse as a known coping mechanism for PTSD.287 The veteran 
acknowledged his mistakes, and the Board noted what it viewed as 
inconsistencies in the veteran’s reasons for using drugs: caring for his children 
and self-medicating.288 Rather than at least recognizing the self-medication as a 
symptom and even partially mitigating his status, the Board suggested that caring 
for children could not justify drug use even if self-medication could.289 It is not 
clear whether the Board would have upgraded the veteran’s status if he had not 
mentioned caring for children, because the Board did not clarify whether both 
bases for drug use were inadequate to establish a nexus.290   
A. Resistance to Providing Full Relief 
Liberal consideration is a veteran-friendly policy shift, designed to give 
veterans a “reasonable opportunity for relief.”291 Liberal consideration 
encourages relief but does not require full relief in the form of upgrades to 
Honorable. Still, the premise of liberal consideration suggests that real and full 
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relief comes only from an upgrade to Honorable.292 The Board, however, often 
skirts full relief by finding in favor of granting relief based on liberal 
consideration, but then denying full relief on other grounds.293 It is reasonable 
that there could be some cases where partial relief (or no relief) is appropriate 
even within the liberal consideration scheme. For example, when a pattern of 
misconduct is so egregious as to suggest some level of willfulness or when the 
connection between a mental health condition and particular behavior is too 
tenuous. Partial relief may be better than denial, but an upgrade to less-than-
Honorable does not reflect the purpose or principles of liberal consideration, 
especially when that partial relief is granted seemingly in disregard of liberal 
consideration. 
For example, in a case where the Board viewed “the case with liberal 
consideration that the Applicant’s well-documented mental health situation 
mitigated the misconduct, the NDRB found the characterization of the 
Applicant’s discharge was inequitable and not consistent with the 
characterization of discharge given others in similar circumstances” for 
“disrespect.”294 If the decision ended there, the veteran would presumably have 
received an upgrade. Instead, the Board went on to discuss how the veteran’s 
commitment to a civilian treatment facility—for treatment of the documented 
mental health condition—was a serious offense of UA.295 
In this confusing and contradictory decision, the Board recognized the well-
documented mental health condition and the nexus between the mental health 
condition and the “disrespect” that led to his discharge. However, the Board 
ignored the nexus between getting treatment for his mental health condition and 
his time away from the Navy.296 Here, the Board did not explain how or why the 
mental health condition did not mitigate the resultant time away in the civilian 
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treatment facility in the same way that it mitigated the disrespect.297 This veteran 
had a strong record of service, with Honorable service for seven years prior to 
the enlistment he was on at the time of discharge.298 During those seven years, 
he earned two Good Conduct Medals, a Navy Achievement Medal, and other 
awards and promotions.299 His period of UA while in a civilian treatment 
facility—where he was receiving medical care for a mental health condition—
seems like just the sort of circumstance liberal consideration intended to view 
favorably as mitigating the UA, and not as premeditated misconduct.300 In fact, 
a UA for receiving mental health treatment seems even more legitimate as a basis 
for relief than many other types of mental health-associated misconduct, because 
the reason for the “misconduct” was getting treatment for a mental health 
condition.  
For another example, this Article returns to Navy Veteran Michelle Essex’s 
story in the Introduction to demonstrate how the Board avoids full relief. 
Michelle requested an upgrade from “Under Other Than Honorable Conditions” 
to “Honorable” based on MST and related PTSD, which she argued mitigated 
her drug abuse.301 The Board acknowledged her documented PTSD and the 
nexus to her behavior, stating that “the NDRB determined [her] diagnosed PTSD 
and MST was a mitigating factor associated with her in-service misconduct.”302 
Prior to her active duty enlistment, Michelle had six years of reserve duty and 
received multiple awards including three Navy and Marine Corps Achievement 
Medals and the Naval Reserve Meritorious Service Medal.303 She served a 
combat tour in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, and her exemplary 
service was well documented in her performance record.304  
On these facts, liberal consideration required a balancing of the MST and 
PTSD against the misconduct, drug abuse (a recognized coping mechanism for 
PTSD). But the Board did not engage in that balancing; instead, the Board found 
that Michelle’s “service was honest and faithful but significant negative aspects 
of [her] conduct outweighed the positive aspects of [her] service which 
warrant[ed] changing [her] discharge” to only General (Under Honorable 
Conditions) rather than to Honorable.305 The Board’s balancing was about 
positive and negative service aspects, not about how MST and PTSD could have 
mitigated her drug abuse. Thus, the Board misdirected its decision, veering away 
from the lens of liberal consideration. 
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The Board also recognized that “PTSD and MST [were] a mitigating 
factor.”306 As a basis for the partial relief of a General (Under Honorable 
Conditions) upgrade, the Board stated that “the NDRB does not consider PTSD 
as a reason to completely absolve the Applicant of her misconduct.”307 This 
statement stood on its own with no engagement with how it may be inconsistent 
with liberal consideration.308 Liberal consideration indicates that the severity of 
the misconduct will only outweigh the mental health condition in “some cases,” 
309 but the Board did not explain how this particular case falls into that limited 
scope of cases.310 Instead, the Board seemed to use a predetermination that PTSD 
could not absolve misconduct, in disregard of the Kurta Memo’s guidance 
relevant to the facts here that “substance-seeking behavior and efforts to self-
medicate symptoms of a mental health condition may warrant consideration.”311 
The Kurta Memo further instructs that the “relative severity of some misconduct 
can change over time, thereby changing the relative weight of the 
misconduct,”312 yet the Board ignores this with the blanket boilerplate statement: 
“Violation of Article 112a though isolated, warrant[s] separation from the Naval 
Service to maintain proper order and discipline.”313 The Board’s recognition of 
the violation as isolated renders its determination not to upgrade to Honorable 
even more egregious. This is because liberal consideration is founded on the idea 
that relief is appropriate when a servicemember’s infrequent or isolated 
misconduct resulted from a mental health condition.314  
Michelle should have benefited from liberal consideration and received a 
full upgrade to Honorable under the Kurta Memo. As the Kurta Memo directs, 
“Honorable discharge characterization does not require flawless service” but 
rather includes even “some relatively minor or infrequent misconduct.”315 
Because of the Board’s illiberal consideration, the Board granted partial relief to 
change her service characterization to “General (Under Honorable Conditions).” 
But, the Board did nothing to change the narrative reason for her discharge, and 
so she continues to carry “Misconduct (Drug Abuse)” on her DD-214 even 
though the Board determined some relief was appropriate.316 
The Board has also managed to deny relief by outright ignoring liberal 
consideration. For example, in the case of a servicemember discharged as a result 





309. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 18. 
310. See NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1. 
311. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 19. 
312. Id. attach. ¶ 26(i). 
313. NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1 (referring to 10 U.S.C. § 912a, which concerns 
“[w]rongful use, possession, etc., of controlled substances”). 
314. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(h). 
315. Id. attach. ¶ 26(h). 
316. NDRB No. ND17-01559, supra note 1. 
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charges, the Board focused on “using, transporting, and possessing narcotics” as 
an offense warranting separation, without putting the offense in the context of 
liberal consideration.317 The servicemember had documented PTSD, and the 
Board noted that the records “support[ed] the Applicant’s contention that his 
PTSD could have been a mitigating factor associated with the in-service 
misconduct.”318 The Board also noted “the Applicant’s heroic and meritorious 
service in combat.”319 With clear answers to the first three Kurta Memo questions 
(documented diagnosis, in-service, and nexus), liberal consideration requires 
balancing.320 However, there was no balancing in the decision. Instead, the Board 
left open the question of how to balance PTSD with the misconduct, and 
concluded by denying relief.  
In these partial and no-relief cases involving mental health conditions and 
misconduct, the Board almost seemed to mock servicemembers by 
acknowledging their mental health condition, the connection between the 
condition and misconduct, and the potential for the condition to mitigate the 
misconduct. It is not clear what motivated the Board to deny relief in cases that 
appeared to warrant relief under liberal consideration. Still, these themes may 
suggest a bias in favor of the original commander’s decisions and a resistance to 
recognizing Honorable as other than flawless.321 Thus, any solution requires 
grappling with these underlying limitations. 
V. 
STOP KICKING AND START LIBERALLY CONSIDERING: MECHANISMS FOR 
ENSURING LIBERAL APPLICATION OF LIBERAL CONSIDERATION AT THE NDRB 
The themes described in Part IV represent shortcomings in both the liberal 
consideration policy itself—in terms of insufficient implementation guidance—
and in the Board’s implementation of liberal consideration, and many of the 
themes (and decisions) reflect a mix of shortcomings. On a general level, liberal 
consideration’s failure at the NDRB seems to stem from two interrelated reasons. 
First, the Kurta Memo did not explain how liberal consideration changes deeply 
entrenched ideas about what Honorable means. Second, the Kurta Memo did not 
change existing guidance or procedures, including traditional presumptions 
under which the NDRB operates, or the inherent and acknowledged bias board 
 
317. NDRB No. ND17-01210 (on file with author). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 2(d), 18–19. 
321. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Esper, No. 3:16-cv-02010-WWE, 2018 WL 6727353, at *5 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 21, 2018) (noting the alleged “systematic failure of the ADRB to give proper consideration to the 
directive of the Hagel Memo relevant to discharge upgrade applications”); Manker v. Spencer, No. 3:18-
cv-00372-CSH, 2019 WL 5846828, at *11 (D. Conn. Nov. 7, 2019) (discussing the plaintiffs’ contention 
that the “NDRB has systematically denied veterans a fair discharge review process”); Complaint at 3, 
37, Manker, supra note 168 (noting the NDRB’s denial of “almost 90 percent of applications alleging 
PTSD or PTSD-related conditions” and describing the NDRB’s low grant rate as indicating “systemic 
institutional bias or secret policy”); see also supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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members have in favor of commanders’ original discharge decisions. In other 
words, liberal consideration created a means to relief but did not provide the 
infrastructure to grant relief. And the Board has not taken it upon itself to create 
that infrastructure, but instead continues to rely on past approaches.  
At least to some extent, it seems that the Board’s “reasons” for denying 
relief are just ways to mask the tension between what Honorable has historically 
meant and what Honorable can mean in the liberal consideration context. This is 
especially true in light of how the Board often describes an Honorable discharge 
as a limited characterization due to only those who deserve it: 
The NDRB recognizes that serving in the all-volunteer Armed Forces is 
challenging but reflects a commitment to our Nation; thus, service 
members deserve to be recognized upon completion of their service. 
One of the ways in which our service members are recognized is through 
the determination of their characterization of service. Most 
servicemembers, however, serve honorably and therefore earn their 
Honorable discharges. In fairness to those Marines and Sailors who 
served honorably, Commanders and Separation Authorities are tasked 
to ensure that undeserving servicemembers receive no higher 
characterization than is due.322 
In this statement, the Board implicitly rejects an expansive interpretation of 
Honorable, even though that is exactly what liberal consideration contemplates 
as a result of no longer punishing servicemembers for having mental health 
conditions that mitigate misconduct.323 Though the NDRB does not explicitly 
define Honorable as limited, this oft-repeated blanket statement about declining 
to upgrade a discharge to preserve the honor and fairness to others with an 
Honorable discharge suggests that the Board’s standard is “flawless.” This 
standard persists even though neither DoD’s guidance nor the Navy’s guidance 
requires flawless service to justify an Honorable characterization. Furthermore, 
the Board’s statement about “undeserving servicemembers” suggests that 
upgrading other-than-honorable discharges would somehow taint original 
Honorable discharges.324 These limitations of liberal consideration under the 
Kurta Memo serve as a starting point for strengthening implementation.325 
A. Redefining Honorable in a Liberal Consideration World 
Liberal consideration requires tolerance, open-mindedness, and 
receptiveness to change. The NDRB must suspend its disbelief that mental health 
conditions can mitigate bad behavior to the extent that an Honorable discharge 
 
322. NDRB No. ND18-0047, supra note 211. 
323. See sources cited supra note 162. 
324. Without advancing any supporting evidence, the Board often relies on this assumption—
that upgrading would have an effect of undermining others’ Honorable service. 
325. There are probably solutions at the Separation Authority level, as well, that would prevent 
the military from discharging servicemembers with an other-than-honorable discharge in the mental 
health-misconduct scenarios, but that is not the focus here. 
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is justified. The Board has to get away from its traditional approach: refusing to 
upgrade and confirming the punishment (or discipline) that the Separation 
Authority issued. Under liberal consideration, the Board needs to end the practice 
of providing only partial relief in the form of General discharges. The Board’s 
denial of many discharge upgrade requests under ostensibly liberal consideration 
is a failure to implement policy; the denial also perpetuates injustice for those 
who have served.  
To that end, “Honorable” in the context of Honorable discharge requires an 
update. Honorable should be reimagined in the context of all that is known about 
mental health conditions and behavior, as experienced by servicemembers. 
Rather than punishing servicemembers for how their bodies and minds reacted 
to what they experienced while in service, discharge characterizations should 
consider service fulfilled despite health challenges and should avoid a 
requirement of flawless service. Honorable characterizations in cases where 
misconduct is linked to mental health conditions also reflect the nature of the 
unwritten contract between the service and the servicemember: to leave no man 
or woman behind.326 To truly leave no man or woman behind, to erase the 
historic hostility and bias against what is viewed as weakness when it is in fact a 
mental health condition, and to remove the punitive nature of other-than-
honorable discharges, “Honorable” must be viewed expansively through the lens 
of liberal consideration. Redefining Honorable does not mean lessening the value 
or honor to those who already have an Honorable discharge, but instead more 
fairly recognizes a range of service and more accurately reflects a changing 
military and society. 
With authority over each service branch, DoD should ultimately mandate 
any redefinition of “Honorable,” with each branch implementing the change in 
its own service-specific documents. As a reminder, DoD defines Honorable as 
“service [that] generally has met the standards of acceptable conduct and 
performance of duty for military personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that 
any other characterization would be clearly inappropriate.”327 The services each 
define Honorable similarly.328  
 
326. See, e.g., Charles Bausman, Leave No Man Behind- Implications, Criticisms, and 
Rationale, MOUNTAIN TACTICAL INST. (Sept. 2, 2016), https://mtntactical.com/knowledge/leave-no-
man-behind-implications-criticisms-rationale/ [https://perma.cc/BU4T-ZG7G] (“‘Leave No Man 
Behind’ is a creed and ethos often repeated and adhered to by various units and soldiers.”); Sean D. 
Naylor & Christopher Drew, SEAL Team 6 and a Man Left for Dead: A Grainy Picture of Valor, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 27, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/world/asia/seal-team-6-afghanistan-
man-left-for-dead.html [https://perma.cc/A6MA-EXFE] (“Like some other military units, Team 6 
accepts as an article of faith that its members never leave a fallen comrade behind. While that can be 
difficult to fulfill, it is a creed as old as warfare itself, a pact with those facing great peril. Abandoning a 
wounded man to fight and die by himself, however inadvertent, officers say, would be devastating.”). 
327. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a). 
328. See, e.g., AR 135-178, supra note 47, para. 2-9(a) (defining Honorable as “appropriate 
when the quality of the Soldier’s service generally has met the standards of acceptable conduct and 
performance of duty for Army personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that any other characterization 
would be clearly inappropriate”); MILPERSMAN 1910-304, supra note 48, para. 1, at 1 (defining 
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A redefinition project should involve various stakeholders working 
collaboratively toward a new definition, and should not rely solely on high-level 
DoD officials at the development stage.329 These stakeholders include active-
duty servicemembers and veterans; officers and enlisted personnel; mental 
health care providers; representatives from Veteran Service Organizations;330 
veterans’ advocates; veterans law clinic directors; and law professors. The 
stakeholders should craft an explicit statement supporting the idea that 
Honorable includes service by someone who experienced a traumatic event, 
PTSD, or another mental health condition, and acted consistently with symptoms 
of that condition, even when those actions would otherwise be defined as 
misconduct by the UCMJ.  
There are three considerations in redefining Honorable to account for 
liberal consideration, the evolving nature of military service, and a changing 
society. First, a reimagined definition of Honorable should be more inclusive, 
explicitly rejecting a requirement of flawless service and explaining the 
standards of acceptable conduct and performance within a range that includes 
behavior consistent with a mental health condition. The new definition should 
grapple with the concept of good order and discipline and what that means in the 
context of mental health conditions that today’s military servicemembers 
experience. Rather than focusing on good order and discipline from the exclusive 
perspective of commanders charged with “tight control over their forces,”331 a 
new definition should account for a broader understanding of military service.  
Second, the definition should include language about mental health 
conditions and how they can mitigate behavior that may otherwise be categorized 
as misconduct. For example, the definition could say something like: “In the 
recognition that military service can include stressors that cause PTSD or other 
mental health conditions, servicemembers should not be punished for behavior 
related to these conditions and instead should be recognized for their service in 
spite of these challenges.” Alternatively, the definition could provide: 
“Honorable service includes behavior that may be categorized as misconduct 
under the UCMJ but is actually behavior consistent with a mental health 
condition due to military service.” A redefinition should clarify that the 
 
Honorable as “[when] the quality of the member’s service generally met the standard of acceptable 
conduct and performance for naval personnel, or is otherwise so meritorious that any other 
characterization of service would be clearly inappropriate”). 
329. Such a collaboration has also been proposed by Human Rights Watch in regard to 
developing a “working group with representatives from each service’s Board, civilian lawyers, and 
veterans’ organizations to study standards for granting relief, determine best practices and procedures, 
and make recommendations for uniform standards and procedures to be included in revised Defense 
Department instructions.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 118. 
330. OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VETERANS AND MILITARY 
SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS, https://www.va.gov/vso/VSO-Directory.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GQ5-
6CK3]. 
331. Weber, supra note 52, at 160. 
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connection between behavior and mental health recognizes the servicemember’s 
honor and commitment to service while facing mental health challenges. 
In the context of mental health conditions, there could also be a bifurcated 
definition of Honorable: one for a commander’s original discharge decision, and 
one for an upgrade decision. This could be particularly effective when a 
servicemember is discharged for misconduct without a mental health condition 
diagnosis, but later presents a post-service diagnosis to a discharge review board. 
For example, an Honorable definition for discharge upgrades could include 
language such as: “Honorable service includes service by a servicemember 
originally discharged for misconduct when it is later determined that an in-
service mental health condition mitigates that misconduct under liberal 
consideration.”  
Third, the definition or guidance accompanying the definition should 
explain that the discharge characterizations should reflect military and societal 
changes. The definition should make room for the “significant modifications” to 
warfare, “the pool of people from which the military draws,” and “society’s 
expectations on how military members will be treated.”332 For example, the 
definition could add language to account for the specific context of the 
servicemember’s service. Instead of defining Honorable as justified when “the 
quality of the member’s service generally met the standard of acceptable conduct 
and performance for naval personnel,”333 the definition could broaden the 
definition to recognize quality as holistic and the standard as modified by 
particular duty assignments. An example of this change could be: “[based on a 
holistic assessment,] the quality of the member’s service generally met the 
standard of acceptable conduct and performance for naval personnel [in the 
particular duty assignment(s)].”  
The definition should also outline how the historical severity of some 
misconduct can change over time to become less severe, as a way to force the 
boards to see the changing landscape, so the boards are not blinded by traditional 
views on behavior. For example, the Kurta Memo recognizes that “marijuana 
use is still unlawful in the military but it is now legal in some states and it may 
be viewed, in the context of mitigating evidence, as less severe today than it was 
decades ago.”334 The military is an organization of tradition; it changes very 
slowly and often with heavy resistance, but a definition that acknowledges 
changing views can force commanders and discharge review boards to grapple 
with outdated assumptions that no longer warrant an other-than-honorable 
discharge.  
If defining Honorable with all these considerations proves too complex, 
DoD could provide a general definition and then go into details in subsections. 
 
332. Id. at 161; see also id. at 176–77 (proposing a “workable definition of good order and 
discipline”). 
333. MILPERSMAN 1910-304, supra note 48, para. 1, at 1. 
334. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(i). Note that changes to the UCMJ would be an 
additional forward-looking step, but that is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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DoD could add language to the definition to remind the boards that a discharge 
decision must be made on an individual basis. For example, the phrase 
“acceptable conduct and performance of duty for military personnel,”335 could 
be modified to include “under the circumstances,” to acknowledge the variety of 
situations military personnel experience and to require the boards to fully 
consider the particular circumstances of each case.  
To the extent that structuring a definition may prove challenging given the 
various stakeholders’ interests, the stakeholders should not let the challenge stop 
them from working toward a compromise, even if that compromise yields a 
complicated result. There is plenty of existing complexity and specificity in 
many DoD and military policies and procedures. Furthermore, none of the 
proposed changes would mean that suddenly everyone receives an Honorable 
discharge. The military may also need to slightly alter the remaining discharge 
characterizations, but these characterizations would not be substantively affected 
by expanding the meaning of Honorable. Moreover, misconduct unrelated to a 
mental health condition would not necessarily warrant an Honorable discharge 
under a new definition, though there may be room for a relaxed view of some 
behavior in line with societal changes. For example, as described above, an 
isolated instance of recreational marijuana use that is not connected to a mental 
health condition might still warrant an upgrade given changing societal norms. 
The stakeholders should work towards a compromise, even if doing so seems 
challenging. 
A broader definition of Honorable would not, as the Board suggests, be 
unfair to other servicemembers because broadening the definition would not 
change the quality of service.336 Unfairness would result from designating 
Honorable to someone who did not meet the definition; for example, someone 
with multiple violations of the UCMJ and no mental health condition to mitigate 
the violations, someone with a mild mental health condition that could not be 
connected to subsequent misconduct, or someone with a mental health condition 
and misconduct that was connected to something else (e.g., stealing to pay off a 
gambling debt or defacing property as artistic expression).  
Accordingly, an expanded definition merely accounts for the evolving 
understandings of mental health and behavior in a liberal consideration world. 
Acknowledging that some behavior historically labeled as “misconduct” is 
actually coping behavior connected to a mental health condition, and recognizing 
that service under those conditions is as honorable as service completed without 
a mental health condition and resulting misconduct, only serve to raise the 
overall profile of military service in modern times. The fact that the number of 
Honorable discharges could and should increase under an expanded definition 
does not diminish other veterans’ Honorable service. Rather than continuing to 
dismiss veterans with mental health conditions and records of misconduct as 
 
335. DoDI 1332.14, supra note 43, enclosure 4, para. 3(b)(2)(a). 
336. See, e.g., NDRB No. ND18-00471, supra note 211. 
1410 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  108:1357 
“undeserving,” a reimagined definition would reflect a better, fairer, and more 
just understanding of the various parameters of Honorable service. 
With a more expansive definition that incorporates the underpinnings of 
liberal consideration, the NDRB would have a better infrastructure within which 
to make decisions.337 Of course, given its track record, there may be little reason 
to think the Board would fully comply with a more expansive definition just 
because it was supposed to.338 For this reason, additional, more specific changes 
are required, as discussed in the following Section.  
B. Revising Presumptions, Policies, and Procedures to Resolve 
Inconsistencies Between Liberal Consideration and Service-specific 
Procedural Guidance 
In addition to reimagining the meaning of Honorable, there are numerous 
presumptions, policies, and procedures that also require revision for consistency 
with liberal consideration and a more expansive meaning of Honorable. Given 
the number of presumptions, policies, and procedures involved in the boards’ 
decision-making, including some that may be unstated,339 this Article offers 
some initial suggestions.340 
1. Eliminate the Presumption of Government Regularity in Cases 
Involving Mental Health Conditions 
One of the most powerful bases to deny discharge upgrade requests is the 
presumption of government regularity.341 The boards treat this regulatory 
presumption as a blanket justification for denying relief.342 In other words, when 
the boards invoke the presumption, all other considerations seem to fall away. 
That approach, however, is inconsistent with liberal consideration that, in 
essence, undermines the nature of a presumption of government regularity. 
Given the inherent and acknowledged bias board members have in favor of the 
 
337. A more expansive or current definition could also lead to fewer other-than-honorable 
discharges at the time of discharge, and that change would also be a win for servicemembers with mental 
health conditions, but my focus here is about relief at the discharge review board for the thousands of 
veterans already discharged. 
338. See supra Part IV (discussing the Board’s failure to implement liberal consideration). 
339. See, e.g., Complaint, Manker, supra note 168. The prayer for relief includes injunctive relief 
to require the NDRB to “establish[] constitutionally and statutorily compliant adjudication procedures, 
including, but not limited to, publication of secret policies, improved training of agency personnel, and 
clarified evidentiary standards,” and also “to ensure that the [NDRB] meaningfully and consistently 
applies its own procedural standards in considering the effects of class members’ PTSD when 
determining whether to upgrade their discharge statuses.” Id. at 41. 
340. Of course, DoD policy change alone has been inadequate, but service-level policy change 
consistent with a redefined, more expansive and inclusive understanding of Honorable would at least 
create the opportunity to push the boards in the right direction. 
341. 32 C.F.R. § 724.211 (2018) (“There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of 
governmental affairs. This presumption can be applied in any review unless there is substantial credible 
evidence to rebut the presumption.”). 
342. See supra Part IV.A. 
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commanders who made the original decisions,343 this presumption of 
government regularity creates too high a burden for veterans seeking upgrade 
related to a mental health condition.  
The underlying point of liberal consideration is that commanders were 
unfairly discharging servicemembers with other-than-honorable discharges. The 
unfair discharges focused on the misconduct while ignoring the existence of 
PTSD and other mental health conditions that could explain the misconduct as 
behavior consistent with the mental health condition rather than as willful 
misconduct. When the NDRB relies on the presumption of regularity to deny 
relief in the liberal consideration world, it is reaffirming what may have been 
unfair in its regularity. In other words, “regular” does not mean “right” in the 
context of how the military has responded to mental health conditions and 
misconduct in the past. Presuming government regularity as a mechanism for 
denying a discharge upgrade request is inconsistent with liberal consideration’s 
recognition that past decisions may have been wrong, or at least inequitable. 
Therefore, the NDRB must at least recognize this contradiction, stop relying on 
the presumption as a strong justification for denying relief, and more fully 
engage in the review of discharge decisions through the lens of liberal 
consideration. Without letting go of the presumption, the Board cannot truly and 
fully apply liberal consideration.  
To eliminate the presumption of government regularity in cases involving 
mental health conditions, DoD could issue clarifying guidance. A potential 
guidance statement could read: “In cases involving mental health conditions 
diagnosed in-service, there is no presumption of government regularity in the 
discharge decision.” For those cases involving no in-service diagnosis, but with 
a post-service diagnosis, the guidance could be something like this:  
In cases involving mental health conditions unknown to the separation 
authority at the time of discharge but later diagnosed, the presumption 
of government regularity does not override the principles of liberal 
consideration. Even though an original discharge decision may have 
been regular, liberal consideration recognizes the potential inequity 
given the post-service diagnosis. Thus, no decision may rest solely on 
the presumption of government regularity and that presumption will not 
automatically outweigh any potential mitigation due to a mental health 
condition. 
Ideally, new guidance would force the boards to grapple with the presumption 
of regularity and how it does not work in the context of mental health conditions 
and misconduct—or at least recognize how it does not work exactly the same 
way as it did before liberal consideration. This change would also make it harder 
for board members to act on their bias in favor of the commanders. Without the 
presumption to rely on as a complement to bias against the veteran, the boards 
 
343. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
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would necessarily have to more fully consider each discharge upgrade request 
related to a mental health condition.  
To take this proposal to eliminate the presumption of government regularity 
even further, the Board can interpret liberal consideration as creating a veteran-
favorable presumption and rejecting the traditional government-favorable 
presumption of government regularity. This is consistent with the Kurta Memo’s 
guidance to recognize veterans as “victim[s] of injustice” rather than as 
wrongdoers.344 Within such a presumption, instead of applying government 
regularity to deny relief as usual, the Board would presume that the government’s 
regularity was actually problematic in assigning a less-than-honorable discharge 
in the first place. That presumption may not be enough to grant relief, but it 
would tip the balance toward finding in favor of the veteran rather than simply 
affirming a commander’s decision.  
2. Limit Discretion in Some Cases for Presumptive Relief Under Liberal 
Consideration 
To improve compliance with liberal consideration (as well as combat the 
admitted bias the NDRB has against the “unsophisticated” veterans and in favor 
of their peer-commanders), DoD could limit the boards’ discretion. To that end, 
DoD could mandate upgrades under certain conditions such as mental health or 
PTSD. Other advocates have called for similar presumptions.345 For example, 
liberal consideration could require an upgrade to Honorable when the following 
elements are satisfied: 
1. veteran has a documented mental health diagnosis; 
2. veteran’s misconduct was of a certain type (e.g., drug use or 
UA for a limited number of days); and 
3. there is evidence supporting the connection between the mental 
health condition and the misconduct, such as general research 
showing the type of behavior likely related to the mental health 
condition.346   
 
344. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 26(j). 
345. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 122 (recommending that Congress 
“[c]odify a presumption for veterans with documented PTSD that the PTSD contributed materially to 
discharge classification”); SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 9 (“Legislation should codify a 
presumption of record correction for veterans with documented PTSD so that boards continue to 
improve their handling of PTSD-related discharge upgrade applications.”); see also supra Part V.B.3. 
346. DoD could consider creating specific metrics mandating an upgrade in some cases and 
allowing discretion in others. For example, a documented PTSD diagnosis, two instances of drug use, a 
nexus between the PTSD and drug use, and no other misconduct could be a scenario requiring an 
automatic upgrade. On the other hand, a documented PTSD diagnosis, five instances of drug use, a 
nexus between the PTSD and the drug use, and no other misconduct could require the Board’s discretion 
in applying liberal consideration due to the number of instances of drug use. Any changes to establish 
presumptive relief would also require updating service-specific instructions as illustrated by the 
examples in this part. For example, if drug use is recognized as a mitigated behavior in mental health 
condition cases, instructions requiring mandatory processing for administrative separation for drug 
use—regardless of grade, performance, or time in service—would have to be revised. The Kurta Memo 
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This presumptive approach eliminates the balancing that the Kurta Memo 
requires,347 to minimize the boards’ discretion. DoD could decide which 
categories of minor misconduct are presumptively mitigated by mental health 
conditions and require the boards to upgrade in those scenarios. This approach 
would also prevent the boards from falling back on government regularity or 
other presumptions to avoid granting relief, and help prevent bias against the 
veteran.  
3. Revise Navy Instructions for Consistency with Liberal 
Consideration 
All services have their own instructions governing separation procedures in 
addition to the general DoD guidance. The examples here focus on Navy 
instructions but are applicable to all the branches. Given the specificity of Navy 
instructions governing discharges and discharge upgrades, change is needed to 
comply with liberal consideration as it exists and further develops. For example, 
the Navy has not updated its instruction for NDRB procedures and standards 
since December 22, 2004, well before liberal consideration was implemented.348 
This gap may offer some explanation for the NDRB’s failure to implement the 
Kurta Memo guidance because the Board may view compliance with the Navy-
specific instruction as more precedential than the general DoD guidance. To 
eliminate any conflict, the Navy instruction should be revised for consistency 
with liberal consideration. To the extent that there is a new definition of 
Honorable, the Board still needs revisions such as those proposed here to comply 
with that new definition.  
In other words, to the extent that there is some overlap between the proposal 
to redefine Honorable and the suggestion to revise Navy instructions, this is 
intentional. For example, the conflict between liberal consideration and the 
presumption of government regularity as it currently exists should be resolved in 
Navy policy. Navy policy recognizes the presumption of government affairs 
generally and also within the context of how to review evidence and testimony. 
In both instances, revision is needed for consistency with liberal consideration. 
The following examples show the existing language of the instruction in regular 
text followed by the proposed language for resolving the conflict in italicized 
text.  
Example 1: 
Existing Text of Instruction: 
211. Regularity of Government Affairs 
 
explains that drug use may be viewed as consistent with mental health conditions and opens the door to 
a less strict view on drug use. However, without a corresponding change in Navy policy, the NDRB 
may uphold a discharge under Navy policy even if inconsistent with liberal consideration. 
347. Kurta Memo, supra note 39, attach. ¶ 18. 
348. SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70. Even though the Navy website lists December 
16, 2015, as the “modified” date, the instruction was last updated December 22, 2004. Id. app. D. 
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There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental 
affairs. This presumption can be applied in any review unless there 
is substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption. 349 
Proposed Revision: 
211.  Regularity of Government Affairs 
a. In cases not involving mental health conditions, there is a 
presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental 
affairs. This presumption can be applied unless there is 
substantial credible evidence to rebut the presumption. 
b. In discharge upgrade applications involving a mental 
health condition350 as potentially mitigating the 
misconduct that was the basis for discharge, the 
presumption of regularity in the conduct of government 
affairs shall not apply. Instead, the Board will apply the 
liberal consideration policy guidance set forth in the Kurta 
Memo to fully consider the discharge upgrade request with 
the understanding that the government has no favored 
position in cases involving discharges with diagnosed or 
undiagnosed mental health conditions.   
Example 2: 
Existing Text of Instruction: 
403.  Conduct of Reviews 
m. Evidence and Testimony 
(6) There is a presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental 
affairs. This presumption will be applied in any review unless there is substantial 
credible evidence to rebut the presumption.351 
Proposed Revision: 
403.  Conduct of Reviews 
m. Evidence and Testimony 
(6)(a) In cases not involving a mental health condition, there is a 
presumption of regularity in the conduct of governmental affairs. 
This presumption can be applied unless there is substantial credible 
evidence to rebut the presumption. 
(b) In discharge upgrade applications involving a mental health 
condition as potentially mitigating the misconduct that was the 
basis for discharge, the presumption of regularity in the conduct of 
 
349. Id. para. 211. 
350. An alternative proposal is to include the Kurta Memo’s specifically named mental health 
conditions, “PTSD; TBI; sexual assault; and sexual harassment,” supra note 39, attach. ¶¶ 26(d)–(e), as 
a way to limit the change to the presumption. But that list could prove too restrictive as more becomes 
understood about mental health conditions and military service. A broader term here would allow room 
for developments in the research of mental health conditions and their relationships to behavior, as well 
as create flexibility to respond to the evolving nature of the military. 
351. SECNAVINST 5420.174D, supra note 70, para. 403(m)(6). 
2020] KICKED OUT, KICKED AGAIN  1415 
government affairs shall not apply. Instead, the Board will apply 
the liberal consideration policy guidance set forth in the Kurta 
Memo to fully consider the discharge upgrade request with the 
understanding that the government has no favored position in cases 
involving discharges with diagnosed or undiagnosed mental health 
conditions.   
(c) Liberal consideration relaxes the evidentiary standard in the 
veteran’s favor.  
These changes would eliminate the conflict between liberal consideration and 
the presumption of government regularity in cases involving mental health 
conditions. The absence of the presumption would force the Board to grapple 
with liberal consideration to explain its decisions. 
These suggestions are offered as examples of the comprehensive changes 
needed to resolve conflicts between liberal consideration and service-specific 
policy. The Navy and all services should conduct a comprehensive review of 
internal policies and procedures, identify all the conflicting provisions, and 
update them accordingly. Though this Article does not identify and offer revision 
for every Navy policy in need of updating to comply with liberal consideration, 
the examples here could serve as templates for the rest of the work.  
4. Improve Oversight and Accountability for Compliance with 
Liberal Consideration 
Greater and enforced accountability for the boards’ compliance with liberal 
consideration is critical. One way to improve accountability by eliminating or at 
least lessening bias against upgrades would be to rebuild the boards themselves 
with all new members, including a medical practitioner and a lawyer. Again, 
considering the NDRB as an example, one approach would be to remove all 
existing board members and the president of the NDRB in light of the deeply 
rooted bias and little likelihood that the Board would on its own suddenly comply 
with liberal consideration. Even though the Board regularly rotates, a completely 
fresh start may be the most likely path to success. Such a measure, however, 
could displace institutional knowledge and raise questions of consistency and 
continuity.  
A more tempered approach would be to restructure the Board over time to 
change the pool of board members to always include junior and senior enlisted 
personnel and non-veteran civilians. For example, a five-member board could 
include two enlisted personnel (one junior and one senior), two officers, and one 
civilian with no prior military service. Changing the membership and the pools 
of members will at least limit the overwhelming bias in favor of commanders’ 
decisions. Enlisted servicemembers may not necessarily favor upgrades, but they 
may offer a perspective for the experiences that led to their fellow enlisted 
servicemembers requesting discharge upgrades. Moreover, including a civilian 
on the board presents an opportunity for a broader perspective free from any 
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biases or presumptions developed as part of military service. Thus, with only two 
officers on a five-member board, the opportunity for bias is minimized. With 
these former commanders in a minority, the officers may contribute to an overall 
higher quality of decision-making that requires grappling with issues that may 
have gone unaddressed or received only superficial attention under the current 
Board’s makeup.352  
Additionally, each board should include at least one medical practitioner. 
There is already a statutory requirement that the boards “shall include a member 
who is a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a physician with training on 
mental health issues connected with [PTSD] or [TBI]” in specific cases.353 These 
special cases are limited to diagnosed mental health conditions. The requirement 
should expand to include a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist, or a specially 
trained physician, for all cases involving mental health conditions, specifically 
including those without a diagnosis. This would create the opportunity for some 
medical evaluation of the record and at least potentially interrupt the boards’ 
historical response to reject upgrade requests in the absence of a diagnosis. Even 
though there may be some efficiency lost for those upgrade applications that do 
not involve mental health conditions, there may be veterans who do not 
specifically identify a mental health condition as part of their request for a 
discharge but have indicators in their record that a medically trained board 
member could recognize or identify as a basis to request additional information 
before making a decision.  
Furthermore, at least one lawyer or judge should be on each board, perhaps 
even as a non-voting member. Adding a law-trained member to the board could 
strengthen the decision-making process because lawyers are trained to read, 
interpret, and apply the law. The Kurta Memo’s guidance is robust and 
complicated, creating a challenging framework for anyone, but perhaps even 
more so for the typical non-lawyer board members. Lawyers and judges are held 
to, and often hold themselves to, ethical standards of professionalism and 
accountability.354 They understand the critical need for substantiating decisions 
and avoiding bias. A lawyer’s presence on the board could inject these ethical 
 
352. In response to the backlogs and varied approval rates among the service boards reported in 
2018, Representative Jackie Speier proposed a unified review board to ensure fairness. Shane, supra 
note 77. A unified review board could lead to easier oversight and accountability of a single board, but 
a consolidated board may not necessarily lead to more efficiency or consistency. Id. In any event, the 
process of creating a unified board would not in itself solve the problems with illiberal application of 
liberal consideration. An overhaul of the process has also been proposed by Human Rights Watch. 
Human Rights Watch concluded that there needs to be wholesale changes in how the military reviews 
such discharges, including the right to hearings where military personnel can tell their stories. See 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 13. Cases should be recorded, summarized, and available to 
petitioners to help guide their appeals. See id. 
353. 10 U.S.C. § 1553(d) (2018). 
354. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (describing 
the basic client-lawyer relationship as one requiring “legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and 
preparation”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2001) (recognizing 
values of “independence, integrity, and impartiality”). 
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standards into the board’s operations and decision-making, to the benefit of both 
the veteran applicants and the board members.   
Accountability also requires more individualized attention in decisions. 
Like the other boards’ decisions, many of the NDRB’s decisions reflect 
boilerplate responses, and the nature of boilerplate indicates a lack of the 
individualized attention that liberal consideration requires. That decisions have 
the same “reasons” for denial before and after liberal consideration also suggests 
that the boards have not complied with liberal consideration to the extent that it 
requires a different approach to decision-making. Here, an internal, non-judicial 
method of oversight would be helpful to ensure compliance with liberal 
consideration. Even an artificial-intelligence method could check for whether the 
boards’ approach to decisions is individualized by identifying all phrases, 
sentences, and paragraphs that are repeated in decisions. Of course, to some 
extent, reuse of language makes sense: it is an efficiency tool and many of the 
decisions do involve similar facts and issues. However, liberal consideration 
requires that the Board do more; efficiency does not outweigh liberal 
consideration’s overall purpose of fairness and justice.  
A robust training program would also help with accountability and create 
opportunities for growth in how the boards function. For example, implicit bias 
training could be an effective method for board members to learn to recognize 
when their implicit biases are getting in the way of liberal consideration.355 The 
boards could also consider joint training with one another to share and learn best 
practices and work toward more consistency among the boards. This joint 
training could be a particularly effective method for contributing to revised DoD 
standards with buy-in from all the services. Of course, training is time away from 
the hearings and decisions in an already-backlogged system, but additional 
delays are worth an overall better process and result for veterans.356  
Finally, in terms of accountability, the boards must comply with reporting 
requirements. The Board is currently not meeting its reporting requirements or 
its public reading room requirements, and there seems to be no penalty for these 
 
355. Given that the board members typically have a non-law-trained background, another 
potential training would cover how boilerplate language is insufficient for the often-complex issues 
raised in discharge upgrade decisions to better equip the board for the individualized decision-making 
process. 
356. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA) calls for more 
training for board members and other improvements. The Act directs the discharge review boards and 
military records corrections boards to seek “advice and counsel . . . from a psychiatrist, psychologist, or 
social worker with training on mental health issues associated with post-traumatic stress disorder or 
traumatic brain injury or other trauma.” 10 U.S.C. § 1552(g)(2) (2020). The statute also requires the 
Defense Secretary to establish a final review procedure giving the Defense Secretary authority to review 
a discharge upgrade request and to recommend upgrade to the Secretary of the military department. 10 
U.S.C. § 1553(a) (2020). The boards’ training curriculum has been expanded to include the topics of 
sexual trauma, intimate partner violence, spousal abuse, and “various responses of individuals to 
trauma.” § 1553 note. The NDAA also calls for reducing the required number of board members from 
five to “not fewer than three.” § 1553(a). 
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shortcomings.357 To increase accountability, DoD should implement new 
standards to ensure accurate and timely reporting of data, commit to a 
redeveloped website that allows future applicants to access decisions in ways 
that help them understand how to write a successful application, and reprimand 
board members for their failures in these areas.358  
Improved accountability during the discharge process is also worth 
mentioning here. As awareness of the relationship between PTSD and combat-
related activities, military sexual assault, or sexual harassment has grown, 
military leaders should take on the burden of providing fair discharges at the 
outset, to avoid any need of a later upgrade. A more expansive meaning of 
Honorable would also help here, to encourage a cultural shift in how the military 
makes discharge decisions. Liberal consideration should be the driving force 
both at the discharge review boards and also at the command-level decisions 
when faced with servicemembers experiencing mental health conditions. Instead 
of focusing on “the effects of substance abuse . . . on . . . discipline and 
performance,”359 for a case involving PTSD, commanders should, as is 
consistent with liberal consideration, consider PTSD as mitigating the behavior. 
Without change on the inside consistent with change at the discharge review 
stage, military leaders will continue on the same path, funneling the next 
generation of the forgotten on to the discharge review boards where, so far, 
veterans have every reason to expect the same historic hostility.   
CONCLUSION 
The ongoing class action lawsuits serve as a potential enforcement 
mechanism for liberal consideration and may create a path to a broader solution. 
Just as the Vietnam veterans’ class action lawsuit led to the Hagel Memo’s 
introduction of liberal consideration, the Kennedy and Manker class actions may 
lead to further policy guidance. However, as has been demonstrated, policy 
guidance alone will not solve the problems at the discharge review boards. 
Furthermore, based on the specific definitions of the classes, the Kennedy and 
Manker cases can potentially provide relief only to a limited group. Veterans, 
 
357. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Even though the public reading room is again 
available, the decisions are not “indexed in a usable and concise form so as to enable the public, and 
those who represent applicants before the DRBs, to isolate from all these decisions that are indexed, 
those cases that may be similar to an applicant’s case and that indicate the circumstances under or 
reasons for (or both) which” a request was granted or denied. See 32 C.F.R. § 724.810(d) (2018). In the 
context of requesting records from the Board for Correction of Naval Records, the Navy has established 
itself as resistant to sharing records. Without increased accessibility, “it will remain difficult to conduct 
a more comprehensive and accurate assessment of the branch’s performance regarding PTSD-based 
claims.” SIDIBE & UNGER, supra note 26, at 7. Human Rights Watch also called for “searchable and 
accessible” decisions and “[enforcement of] the requirement that Boards publish, summarize, and index 
all decisions.” HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 28, at 121. 
358. “The development of discharge upgrades and the Department of Defense’s retooling of 
regulation to prevent unjust discharge from occurring in the first place will be worth tracking in the next 
few years as these efforts come to fruition and spark new efforts.” Simcox, supra note 26, at 572. 
359. Chapman, supra note 28, at 14. 
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whether included in a class or not, deserve to be recognized for their honorable 
service, especially when that service comes at the cost of a mental health 
condition.   
With some or all of the proposed changes described above to redefine 
Honorable or revise internal policies and procedures, there will be a need to 
reconsider prior board decisions denying relief. That will be a daunting task, but 
well worth it for those who were previously denied true liberal consideration. 
For example, a temporary review board could review Michelle’s case and grant 
relief in the form of an Honorable discharge without requiring any additional 
documents from her. On the record alone, there is enough to grant relief, 
consistent with liberal consideration and an expanded definition of Honorable. 
This review should be done for all liberal consideration cases that were denied 
relief or granted only partial relief.  
Future applicants and their advocates should use the boards’ weaknesses to 
strengthen their applications. For example, with an understanding of the boards’ 
bias in favor of the original discharge decision, an application should remind the 
board that liberal consideration requires abandoning that bias and giving full 
liberal consideration to an upgrade involving a mental health condition. Future 
applicants could also stress how an expanded definition of Honorable is 
consistent with liberal consideration to show the board that they are deserving of 
an Honorable discharge. Upgrade requests should be reframed to show how a 
veteran deserves an Honorable discharge because he suffered or suffers from a 
mental health condition and because that condition mitigates his misconduct. 
With that approach, the boards may be more likely to extend the hand of liberal 
consideration to honor these other-than-honorably discharged veterans and break 
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